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ABSTRACT 
This research aims to indicate the sense in which African conceptions of personhood can be 
considered gendered, ableist and anti-queer. In making the case for this, I look at the Force Thesis, 
Shadow Thesis and Ifeanyi Menkiti’s “normative conception of persons”. I argue that each of these 
theories marginalizes at least one of the categories of gender, people with disabilities or queer 
people in their account of personhood. Therefore, I conclude that they should be rejected as 
plausible theories of personhood insofar as it can be argued that inclusive theories of personhood 
are preferable. Namely, theories of personhood that consider gender, people with disabilities and 
queer people. 
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INTRODUCTION  
One of the central issues in African philosophy concerns its nature; there were attempts by Henry 
Odera Oruka to define African philosophy. Oruka identified four trends/classifications of what 
African philosophy is or could be namely; ethnophilosophy, sage philosophy, ideological-
nationalistic philosophy and professional philosophy (1981). Oruka’s classifications have received 
much criticism. One of these criticisms comes from Paulin J. Hountondji (1983) which has sparked 
much of the debates that have been in African philosophy. Of interest to me, are not the debates 
about the existence of African philosophy or Oruka’s classifications, as I think that these debates 
have been engaged with exhaustively (see More (1996), Shutte (1993), Rauche (1996) Wright 
(1979) and Okere (1983) for further readings). I contend that African philosophy does exist in 
which ever format, style or approach. Having said that, since the interests of this project fall within 
the realm of a philosophy that I take to be African in its inquiry; it seems useful for both the reader 
and myself to define what I take African philosophy to be. Given the scope of this project, I note 
that the definition I provide is not exhaustive.  As an African myself I understand African 
philosophy to be the kind of philosophy that is both located and done by an African person. This is 
a kind of philosophy that moves beyond the paradigm of the positivist epistemology. It is a 
philosophy done by subjugated people. To borrow from Anyanwu (1981: 89) cited in Ndaba (1999: 
177), it is a philosophy that arises from one’s imagination, intuitive experience, spirituality and 
feelings as valuable cites of knowing. Found in proverbs, “art, music, folksong and myths” (ibid.), 
yet at the same time does not overlook logical analysis. For I do not think that African philosophy 
does not deploy logic as a tool of analysis, rather unlike Western philosophy, it does not place it at 
the centre.  
In agreement with Hountondji, this loose definition of African philosophy is not an attempt to 
restrict or confine African philosophy as a discipline or any person who claims to be an African 
philosopher. In the preface to the second edition of African Philosophy, Myth & Reality (1983), 
Hountondji rightly quotes Frantz Fanon’s statement that reads: “One should not try to restrict a 
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human being, since his fate is to be set loose” (Fanon (1952:187) cited in Hountondji (1983: x). 
That is, the given definition of African philosophy does not mean that if I as an African, living in 
Africa had an interest in Heidegger, Plato, Kant or Simone de Beauvoir I would not count as an 
African Philosopher. I am of the view that if I use these scholars to better understand or explain my 
current context then I can rightly be an African philosopher. I am in agreement with Hountondji that 
the “Africaness of our philosophy will not necessarily reside in its themes but will depend above all 
on the geographical origin of those who produce it and their intellectual coming together” 
(1983:53).  Here I am also thinking of two South African Black colleagues (Phila Mfundo Msimang 
and Zinhle Mncube to name them) whose areas of interest are located in the Philosophy of Science, 
although some of the radical colleagues working in the area of African philosophy may deny them 
the status of an African philosopher, I would object to the denial of considering them as African 
philosophers 1 . I have no difficulty in admitting that the debate regarding what is African 
philosophy, who counts as an African philosopher is worthwhile in its complexity. I recognise that 
this very loose definition opens me up many criticisms, yet I thought it worthwhile to ensure that 
the reader understands what I take to count as African philosophy in this project. I now turn to why 
I think that African philosophy as a discipline ought to take seriously the task of this dissertation.     
In light of this, the remainder of this dissertation is interested in the political project that African 
philosophy exemplifies. Put more simply, when scholars started arguing, classifying and writing 
about African philosophy – philosophising from the lived-experience of an African, they were 
involved in the political project of defining what African philosophy is. Scholars such as Father 
Placide Tempels (1959), Alexis Kagame (1989), Oruka (1981), Okot p’Bitek (1985), Mudimbe 
                                                
1 There is a difference between African philosophers and African philosophy. African philosophy 
would be work in African philosophy, while African philosophers may strictly speaking refer to the 
origin of the philosopher. So, for example Phila Mfundo Msimang and Zinhle Mncube may be 
called African philosophers insofar as they’re Africans (of course they’re not Asians or Americans 
or British or Europeans) and philosophers (they work in philosophy and indeed, they’re not 
sociologists or botanists) however, they are not scholars of African philosophy. 
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Valentin-Yves (1988), Moya Deacon (2003), Segun Gbadesegin (1991), Didier N. Kaphagawani 
(2004), Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984) (the list goes on), including some of the contemporary African 
philosophers like, Mogobe B. Ramose (2003), Mabogo More (1996), Bernard Matolino (2014), 
Dismas Masolo (2004), Kwasi Wiredu (1992), Kwame Gyekye (1989) just to name a few – have 
been involved in the political project of rewriting how Western discourse has historically theorized 
about the African person. To a certain degree, African philosophy as it stands has been a philosophy 
that tackles oppression and racial discrimination in society. When Temples wrote Bantu Philosophy 
(1959), he challenged the racist assumptions that underpin Western discourse2 - which takes the 
African person as being non-human. Moreover, I think that this political project that I conceive of 
African philosophy to be, falls into the realm of African Humanism. Es’kia Mphahlele defines 
African Humanism as “a search for my own soul” (2002: 135). And this is what I take African 
philosophy to be, a place of writing from one’s own soul, a philosophy that aims to reclaim agency 
for the African self. It is a response to Western Humanism as articulated by Mphahlele that has used 
intelligence, disguised as reason to spew invasions, conquer territories on African soil, “and for the 
slave trade to flourish” (ibid.).   
When looking at the history of African philosophy we note that much debate has been had 
regarding oppression; mainstream debates have focused on race and gender. What is missing from 
                                                
2 One may wonder if Tempels and Kagame where successful in their attempt to challenge how 
Western discourse has theorized about the African person. Both Tempels and Kagame have 
received much criticism from Hountondji (1983) in their theorization of African philosophy. The 
author questions the authenticity, rigor and method of Tempels and Kagame. There is an awareness 
of the controversy in both Tempels and Kagame’s since their publication, to-date. I am in 
agreement with Hountondji’s critique that Temples’ and Kagame’s works were not “addressed to 
Africans but to Europeans” (1983:34), the authors attempts to prove that the African human does 
have ‘rationality’ is one that may not be necessary, as I think that the African does have rationality 
– a claim needing no proof insofar as the African is human. In Section 1.b, I indicate how Kagame’s 
shadow thesis is not so different from Descartes dualism, one then wonders about the sincerity of 
the political project that African philosophy is meant to exemplify (see Cesaire (1972) for further 
reading). I take it that the task at hand here provides further criticism of these theorist that is not 
focused on the philosophical methodology of the authors, rather on their theorization of 
personhood.   
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these conversations is the oppression that is felt by queer3 people4 and people with disabilities5. 
That is, African philosophy needs to adopt a nuanced approach to discussing/theorising about 
oppression moving beyond race and gender, and start to include sexuality and disability. The call is 
for African philosophy to approach oppression from an intersectional lens. Coined by Kimberle 
Crenshaw in “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color” (1989), intersectionality was introduced as a term that underscores the manner in 
which Black women’s experiences of violence is often shaped by “other dimensions of their 
identities, such as race and class” (1989: 1242). As a theory, intersectionality has come to refer to 
the manner in which race, gender, class and other identities such as sexuality interact to shape the 
multiple oppressions that Black women are subject to. The theory acknowledges the differences that 
an individual can have, and how these differences intersect. Differences here are not treated as 
additive (see Collins (1990), Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) for in depth reading). Kathy Davis 
informs us that as a theory intersectionality “promises an almost universal applicability, useful for 
understanding and analysing any social practice, any individual or group experience, any structural 
arrangement, and any cultural configuration” (2008: 72). Such an attempt moves away from 
essentialism, that is viewing a person as a ‘woman’, being ‘queer’ or as ‘disabled’ as such views 
                                                
3 The word originally meant odd, or unconventional. Previously only used as a slur referring to 
LGBTI (this stands for ‘lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex, recently there has been an 
addition of two letters: ‘Q’ for queer and another T for transsexual”. The term queer has now been 
reclaimed by the LGBTI community (Morgan, Marais and Wellbeloved 2009:6).   
4 I use the neutral term ‘people’, who `I am arguing should be considered ‘persons’. I think that 
Menkiti, would find the phrase ‘persons with a disability or queer persons’ incomprehensible – for 
him, it would be a human with a disability or an entity with a disability. Using the phrase ‘persons’ 
here and elsewhere would be begging the question.   
5 Within disability studies there seems to be much contention regarding who counts as a person with 
a disability and who does not. I define disability as per the “social model of disability. Disability 
thus refers to “the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social 
organisation which takes no or little account of people who have impairments and thus excludes 
them from the mainstream of social activities”. (Disabled People International cited in Watson, 
2008:4). It should be noted that I use the social model of disability because it seems coherent with 
communitarianism, this is because the force thesis and the normative communitarian ethic place 
importance on the ontological relationship that an individual has with their community. The 
individual would have no other conception of what it means to be a person with a disability apart 
from engaging in the communal setting that they find themselves in.   
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assume that there is only one way of understanding the subjective identity of that individual and 
thus assumes a “homogenised ‘right way’ to be its member” (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 195). It is 
important to note here that although the concept/theory is/was located in Black feminism or identity 
politics. The theory has been used in disability studies and queer studies recently, extending the 
manner in which these intersecting identities of race, class and gender open up various oppressions 
that an individual can be subject to. In the interest of this dissertation one can think of a queer Black 
woman living with a disability and how all these multiple identities potentially close of the 
possibility of personhood (as will be explored later) at once for this individual.  
Intersectionality as a theory is not divorced from Black feminism.	 The primary concerns of this 
project are made from a Black feminist lens, which is intersectional in its methodology. Black 
feminism as a theory informed my interests in this research project. It thus seems necessary to give 
a brief explanation of what the term means in relation to the project. Black feminism as an 
epistemological theory lands itself in the same position as African philosophy, insofar as it is a 
theory that cherishes different epistemological standards that are consistent with the experiences of 
Black women. In Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of 
Empowerment (1990), Patricia Hill Collins defines the four tents of Black Feminist Epistemology, 
namely: using lived experience as a criterion of meaning; the use of dialogue in assessing 
knowledge claims; the ethic of caring and the ethic of personal accountability (1990: 257, 260, 262 
and 265). These are tenants that I think are similar to the principles of African Humanism as 
defined by Mphahlele (2002). That is, it is theory that treats individuals not as objects as Western 
epistemology has, rather as subjects that have a voice and agency. The theory places the 
experiences of Black women and any other marginalised identity at the forefront of its theorisation.  
In the early stages of formulating the research question of this project, I recognised that the studied 
theories failed to account for how the identified marginalised bodies would gain personhood. Both 
11 
 
in its theorisation and activism Black feminism is anchored by this radical love. bell hooks6 informs 
us that “love as the foundation of all social movements for self-determination is the only way we 
create a world that domination and dominator thinking cannot destroy. Anytime we do the work of 
love, we are doing the work of ending domination” (hooks, 2009: 248). Whilst Black feminism is 
the epistemological framework that motivated the formulation of this research and its question and 
thesis, this does not entail that queer theory and disabilities studies are bracketed under Black 
Feminist epistemology. In writing this dissertation I am aware of the limitations of writing about 
queer and people with disabilities as an abled bodied person. But it is this radical love for ending 
any form of oppression that has motivated me.    	
A rough consideration of how different philosophical schools of thought have defined what a 
‘human being’ is vs. what a ‘human person’ is seems well in order as a prelude to speaking about 
the importance of an inclusive African conception of persons. Within the history of philosophy, no 
consensus has been reached regarding the concept of a person. The debates about the concept of a 
person in Western philosophy can be traced back to John Locke’s (1684) functional definition of 
persons, that argues for specific psychological capacities such as reason; which is both a necessary 
and a sufficient condition for personhood (Showdon, 1995: 655). On the other hand, most 
conceptions of personhood in African philosophy have arguably rejected the functional definition of 
persons and have argued that the definition of personhood stretches beyond one’s psychological 
capacities. More specifically communitarians have argued that personhood cannot be defined 
outside of one’s communities. 
From this observation, one can argue that the diversity in the definition of persons, informs us about 
the significance of the status i.e. that of being a person. Any theory that seeks to make a distinction 
                                                
6 bell hooks is Gloria Jean Watkins pen name. hooks writes her pen name in lower caps, one of the 
reasons is to ensure that she is not mistaken for her maternal grandmother Bell Blair Hooks whom 
she takes the name after. hooks also believes that writing her name in small caps allows the readers 
to focus more on an author’s text and not the authors name.   
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between a ‘human person’ and a ‘human being’ has moral, political and social implications for how 
entities are treated in society. As explained by Eva Feder Kittay “personhood marks the moral 
threshold above which equal respect for the intrinsic value of an individual’s life is required and the 
requirements of justice are operative and below which only relative interest has moral weight” 
(2008: 139). Conceptions of personhood in the past have been capaciously used to exclude certain 
humans who were believed to be incapable of rationality. This speaks to why it is important for 
such a distinction to be made. It then becomes important that any conception of personhood is 
inclusive to ensure that any individual deserving of such moral consideration is not denied the 
duties of justice that are owed to them.    
In the last decade, we have seen much engagement with disability studies and more recently queer 
studies as focus areas in the various disciplines of the humanities and social sciences. These focus 
areas aim at ensuring that people with disabilities and queer people are not discriminated against or 
marginalised in society. The rise in feminist, disability and queer studies in recent years and the 
importance that society places on non-discrimination suggest that exclusionary views, worldviews 
and theories have little place in building an inclusive society. Considering this and in the context of 
African philosophy conversations regarding queer people and people with disabilities have not been 
had.  
If African philosophy is a philosophy that rose out of oppression and comes from a space of writing 
about the lived-experience of people who were once labelled as the ‘other’, then it should have also 
started thinking about oppression outside of race. I contend that any theory in African philosophy 
that wants to be taken seriously should consider some of the advances already made in feminist, 
disability and queer studies. In this thesis, conceptions of personhood in African philosophy will be 
judged to the extent that they are not gendered, ableist and anti-queer. That is, for such theories to 
remain relevant and for them to be taken seriously their characterisation of persons must not 
exclude marginalised bodies (namely, gender, people with disabilities and queer people).  
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The inclusion of marginalised bodies is important because we live in a world where our views and 
theories need to be inclusive to gender, disability and queerness. A theory that is inclusive seems 
preferable than any theory that is exclusionary of minorities and marginalised groups. It goes 
without saying that any conception of personhood will be exclusive to something say dogs, cats, or 
foetuses. But considering the scope of this project, my interests lie with gender, disability and 
queerness. These are interests that I argue ought to be included in any conception of personhood 
given where human rights debates are currently.  
The identified criteria for inclusivity for the purposes of this project are that a theory must not be 
gendered in a discriminatory manner, nor ableist and anti-queer. Hence, we take the three criteria 
for our assessment: gender inclusivity, disability inclusivity and queer inclusivity to be the 
definitive criteria. These three criteria will be used to interrogate the conceptions of persons that are 
examined in this research. On this consideration, a theory that fails on any one of these criteria is to 
be rejected.  
This project seeks a) to determine how prominent conceptions of personhood in African philosophy 
are exclusionary according to gender, sexuality or ability. b) To ascertain the merits of retaining (or 
rejecting) the theories under consideration for further philosophical consideration. As part of my 
assessment, I look at whether the prominent conceptions of personhood are inclusive. At the end of 
the research, I contend that each of the prominent conceptions of personhood should be rejected 
because they are either gendered, ableist or anti-queer.  
This project is important, because (1) it seeks to make a case for the representativeness and 
inclusiveness of minority people and marginalised bodies in our (communitarian) conceptions of a 
person in African philosophy. (2) Consequently, it contributes some new knowledge and points of 
discussion that need to be had within African philosophy. Such a project places the burden on 
proponents of the identified theories of personhood to critically interrogate the inclusivity or lack 
thereof their views. Broadly, however, the project requests that scholars of African philosophy 
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should start to critically question how serious African philosophy is about inclusivity. Intuitively, 
all persons should be concerned about theories that are exclusive, because at any point in time one 
could get a disability, or have a child who is either an intersex or queer. In such a case, one would 
not desire for a loved one or even themselves to be regarded as non-persons.   
This dissertation concerns itself with theories of personhood that are more or less communitarian in 
different garb. The chosen theories of personhood have been construed as communitarian by 
scholars of African philosophy, namely the shadow thesis and founding forms of 
communitarianism, namely, the force thesis and Menkiti’s normative conception of persons.  In my 
conceptual analysis, I indicate that it is only the force and the normative conception of persons that 
proves itself to be communitarian. Although Kaphagawani argues that Kagame’s shadow thesis is 
communitarian (Kaphagawani, 2004: 339), it is clear that it is not a communitarian position. But, so 
long as the shadow thesis is prominent in African philosophy, it remains in my assessment.  
The structure of this dissertation is as follows:  
Section I provides a more elaborated introduction than given here. I explain what is meant by the 
term communitarianism. The section is split into three subsections where I look at the three 
prominent theories of personhood in African philosophy. The point of this section is to sketch out 
how these theories may be construed as exclusive to a particular gender, disability or queerness. 
The aim of this section is to give a pure theoretical abstraction that infers the objections I advance.  
Section II takes up two tasks. Firstly, I detail how these theories are exclusive to the identified 
criteria outlined in the introduction of this dissertation. Secondly, I assess the objections that may be 
advanced against my reading that these theories are not inclusive. In responding to these objections, 
which I take to be unsuccessful, I argue that the studied theories need to give a better explanation as 
to why they base their conceptions of personhood on a criterion that an individual has no control 
over. Based on the conclusions reached in each subsection of section II, my final remarks outline 
the importance of having inclusive theories of personhood. Because scope does not allow me, I do 
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not sketch out what an inclusive communitarian account of personhood would look like. I merely 
ground important theoretical consideration that may be further explored perhaps in a PhD thesis.  
The conclusion notes that the studied theories are exclusive. I provide the communitarian 
philosopher with two options; (1) the communitarian philosopher can accept the conclusions I reach 
and arrogantly retain his theory even if it is exclusive. Or (2) they can revise their theories in 
consideration of the conclusions I reach. I believe that communitarian conceptions of personhood 
should be retained, and so I believe that the communitarian would lean towards the second position.   
What we need are theories that are consistent with the social climate that exists today, that will 
incorporate a non-discriminatory gender bias, include queer people or persons with disabilities.  
 
Section I: Communitarian conceptions of personhood are gender discriminatory, anti-queer 
and ableist: Conceptual analysis 
African communitarian theories or African communitarianism (henceforth communitarianism) as an 
ethic prides itself on the idea that its moral undertones and normative injunctions are compelling in 
virtue of its very robust descriptions of persons and society. Communitarianism is one of the most 
engaged theories, whether in respect of its broader communitarian ethic or in the aspects of its 
conceptions of personhood. Communitarianism as an ethic holds the view that the community’s 
identity is more important than that of the individuals, more importantly that an individual should 
act in ways that will ensure a harmonious society. This harmony is achieved if the individual firstly, 
understands and accepts the communal norms, and that the individual puts these norms first even if 
it comes at the expense of their own personal harmony. A further feature of communitarianism is 
that the conception of personhood is not purely biological, in that being born a human being does 
not grant one personhood; rather communitarians hold the view that human beings are conferred or 
denied the status of personhood by the community.  
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Whilst the theories of personhood differ on how individuals become persons, each view agrees that 
there is a special relationship between the individual and the community. It is important to note that 
when the term communitarianism is used, this term refers to the African sense of community7 in its 
strictest sense, that is it does not refer to the “aggregated sum of individuals” (Menkiti, 1984: 179). 
Rather as Menkiti defines it, it refers to the community in a “collectivist sense” – which is anchored 
by an organic dimension that holds a relationship between the community and the individuals living 
there (ibid. 180).  
Having said that a clear distinction should be noted between communitarianism as an ethic and 
communitarian conception of persons. A communitarian theory of personhood is about persons, i.e. 
what makes a person or being a person and what makes such a being a being is understood in virtue 
of certain things about a community. But communitarianism as a theory is different from a 
communitarian theory of persons. Whereas the latter states that one is a being in virtue of their 
embeddedness in a web of relationships. The former can emerge from this, where the extent of 
which one can be a person is dependent on the communal rituals that one engages with. This is one 
conceptualisation of personhood as theorised by Menkiti, which is “the normative conception of 
personhood is plausible because of the conception of community and its place in African people’s 
normative conceptual scheme “Ikuenobe, 2006: 53). The separation between what 
communitarianism is, from a communitarian theory of persons is then important.  
Conceptions of persons give us insight into what makes a person (umuntu), as well as the defining 
characteristics of what distinguishes a person from a human being. The following conceptual 
analysis aims to assess on what grounds the claims can be made that the studied conceptions of 
personhood are not inclusive in terms of gender fluidity, disability or queerness. Therefore, I do not 
                                                
7 This statement does not entail that African communities are homogenous, rather I use the term 
‘African’ in the same manner that scholars of African philosophy have used the term. Further to 
this, defining communitarianism in this sense ensures that it is not conflated with the Western 
definition of communitarianism, which Menkiti defines as a human group that constitutes human 
groupings characterized by a non-organic relationship between atomic individuals (Menkiti, 1984: 
179- 180).       
17 
 
spend time on elaborating upon the theories in their totality; rather I focus on how these theories (1) 
define personhood and (2) how one gains personhood. In doing so, I will indicate on what grounds 
these claims can be advanced. As suggested in the preceding paragraphs, the force thesis, and the 
normative communitarian present communitarian conceptions of persons in different garbs.  
In presenting these theories I start with Tempels force thesis that came out of his exploration of the 
“Baluba’s ontological system” (Matolino,2014: 10). After this, I then look at Kagame’s shadow 
thesis that resulted from his “direct linguistic analysis of Kinyarwanda” (Hountondji,1983: 40). 
Lastly, I explore Menkiti’s normative communitarian conception of persons.  
1. a. Force thesis 
According to Bantu8 philosophy, as stated by Tempels (1959), to be a person (umuntu) is to be a 
Being with vital force. Tempels explains that when Being is translated to Western terms, ‘it is 
synonymous with ‘person’ (I use the term Being/muntu/person interchangeably9). Tempels states 
that ‘muntu’ does not refer to the physical/visible human body alone. Rather “muntu signifies, [the] 
vital force, endowed with intelligence and will10” (ibid.: 36). This means that the definition of 
muntu is both biological and metaphysical: where the biological refers to the visible body and the 
metaphysical being the ‘vital force’. Force is understood as the “object of prayers and invocation to 
God, to the spirits and to the dead, as well as all that is usually called magic, sorcery or magical 
remedies” (ibid.: 31).  
According to Tempels when the Bantu speak of force, it is not used solely in relation to the body; 
rather force refers to the “integrity of our whole being” (ibid.). Force is then regarded as inseparable 
                                                
8 The term Bantu can be understood in two senses; in the first sense, it refers to the plural word of 
umuntu. The second sense refers to the tribe composed of people who are in the geographical place 
of the South Pole (see Fortunatus, “Placide Tempels on Bantu Ethics”. It is not clear in which sense 
Tempels uses the term. Either sense does not affect his theory.    
9 Capital B, Being or Personhood/Muntu is the result of possessing “vital force”. Lowercase b, 
being, which might be human, animal, plant or object, is the result of possessing “force”. Tempels 
does not articulate the difference in this manner; I think that making such a distinction makes his 
argument easier to follow.  
10 Own emphasis  
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from Being, to be a person is to have vital force, vital force is regarded as the necessary element of 
Being. Simply put, one cannot be a Being without this vital force, Tempels expresses this as “being 
is that which has force” (ibid). As stated by Tempels force is characterised by a hierarchy which is 
primogeniture: where God is at the top of this hierarchy. Following God are the first fathers to man 
whom God first communicated her vital force to, they are the “archipatriarchs” and they have the 
power of “exercising their influences on all posterity” (ibid.:42). Although the first fathers may be 
dead, they are regarded as the spiritualised beings that have influence and participate in the divine 
force. Tempels adds that those who are living belong to this hierarchy (below the archipatriarchs). 
Accordingly, force is not something that is exclusive only to human beings, rather all beings have 
force: “human, animal, vegetable, or inanimate” (ibid). So, whilst all beings may have force, what 
differentiates the muntu from the inferior forces is that the muntu has intelligence and will. It is 
important to note that because all beings have force, this is what makes the force thesis 
communitarian in so far as all beings that stay in this community are endowed with force from God; 
they have a common element/bond that binds them and that is force. Furthermore, not only does 
this force bind them together but their force interacts in various ways. According to Tempels there 
is an “interaction of being with being” that transcends the “mechanical, chemical and psychological 
interactions” that marks the interaction of forces as an ontological relationship (ibid.: 40).  
Tempels further states that “every illness, wound or disappointment, all suffering, depression, or 
fatigue, every injustice and every failure: all these are held to be, and are spoken of by the Bantu as, 
a diminution of vital force” (ibid.: 32). That is any illness, wound or disappointment etc. does not 
have its own vital power, and rather they result from some “external agent who weakens us through 
his greater force. It is only by fortifying our vital energy using magical recipes that we acquire 
resistance to malevolent external forces” (ibid). The force thesis interprets illness (in any form) as 
something that results from someone in the community wanting to make the person sick. They do 
not treat an illness as something that may naturally occur. E.g. If a person in this community 
developed schizophrenia, the community would treat it as something that comes from an external 
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agent. The only way to deal i.e. ‘cure’ it, would be to go to a traditional doctor who would use a 
magical recipe. 
To be a person is to understand that force has a fixed hierarchy (see diagram A below), it requires 
one to possess the capacity of intelligence and will to understand and recognise this hierarchy. It 
entails that one must understand the ontological dependence of forces in beings. That all forces 
influence each other, of which according to Tempels it is the universal truth that “is accepted by 
everyone, it is not subjected to criticism 11 ” (ibid.: 49). When Tempels speaks of muntu, he 
“inherently includes an idea of excellence or plenitude” (ibid.: 67).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, one is a muntu if and only if one is a being with will and intelligence. A being with will 
and intelligence meets both the necessary and sufficient conditions to be considered a muntu. So, if 
it is the case that P is true if and only if Q is true, then Q is necessary and sufficient for P and P is 
necessary and sufficient for Q. If anything fails to be a being or fails to have intelligence and will, 
then it is not a muntu. So, to be a being with intelligence and will is a necessary and sufficient 
                                                
11 Own emphasis  
God: The source of force for every creature. She 
possesses force in herself.   
¯ 
Archipatriarchs/Spirits beings:  whom God communicated 
her vital force with; they constitute the most important 
chain binding the muntu to God. 
¯ 
Muntu: a reflexive self-aware force endowed with 
intelligence and will. Muntu can directly influence 
inferior beings.  
¯ 
Inferior forces: animal, plant, mineral: they exist to 
increase the vital force of uMuntu i.e. they are created for 
the disposal use of man. They do not exercise influence 
over themselves.  
Diagram A 
Force: The 
integrity of being. 
All things in the 
universe possess 
this vital force on 
their own.  
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condition for Being. It follows that according to Bantu philosophy there is only one necessary 
condition for personhood; “intelligence and will”. There are only two predicates (force and 
intelligence and will) Ɐx (Px ↔ Qx) – for all beings if it has intelligence and will, then it is muntu, 
and for all beings, if it is muntu, then it has intelligence and will. If any being fails to have 
intelligence and will, then it is not muntu (and vice versa (as implied by the ‘if, and only if’)).   
Tempels states that muntu must have will and intelligence; these allow the muntu to (1) recognise 
that God is the source of force; (2) to recognise the hierarchy and the ontological 
importance/dependence of this force. Here intelligence is regarded as synonymous with rationality 
(I take “intelligence” to refer to one’s mental capabilities. The Online Oxford Dictionary defines 
intelligence as: the “ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills12”. Intelligence is a cognitive 
trait that differentiates persons from non-persons. Tempels defines ‘will’ as: “the faculty which the 
“muntu” has of deciding by himself and of choosing between a greater and lesser good and evil” 
(ibid.: 69).  
The above is an elaboration of Tempels thesis. I have highlighted the important features that are 
both necessary and sufficient for one to be considered a person. According to which intelligence is a 
necessary condition for personhood. A condition which I believe would exclude people with severe 
cognitive disabilities (henceforth SCD)13 , whom are believed to be without intelligence. Put this 
way SCD people will be excluded from the category of muntu.  
Using the social model of disability, a disability exists only when it is constructed socially and 
constructed in how it arises in a certain situation (Llewellyn and Hogan, 2008:320). That is, 
                                                
12 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/intelligence  
13  I limit my analysis to SCD like Down syndrome, autism, traumatic brain injury (TBI); an 
argument can be made that it would also exclude persons who have physical impairments whether 
they are born with them or because of an illness. Focusing on physical disabilities would be based 
on an assertion. When Tempels states that vital force can be expressed through the body, he does 
not refer to the body in biological terms. Rather, to the moral function of ‘the eye’ (having the 
ability to see evil) or ‘speech’ (when one says something horrible). Although Tempels argues that 
“every illness” results from “magical recipes” (such a statement can open the debate that a disability 
is a result of witchcraft – an issue I take up later).  
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disabilities result in the way that a society is organised, rather than a person’s impairment. Harris C. 
James further states that whilst disabilities may be medical they are also environmental. Importantly 
he adds that “the appreciation of the personhood of each individual recognises that” (2010: 57).  It 
is possible for a community that subscribes to the ‘force thesis’’ definition of persons to deny such 
people personhood based on their lack of ‘intelligence and reason’. According to Tempels such 
people will be treated as a ‘kidima’ which he defines as one who neglects to orientate her life in 
accordance with the given hierarchy of force. Tempels admits that such an individual would be 
regarded as a “sub-human, a man of insufficient mind to count as ‘muntu’” (ibid.: 49). The capacity 
of intelligence and will is a sufficient and necessary condition to be a muntu, because it makes the 
distinction between beings and Being, (understanding and will is important because that’s what 
muntu shares with God) it is marked by rationality and this spiritual connection with God. Without 
this distinction, the concept of muntu does not exist.  
So, if intelligence and will are criteria for being a muntu, this would exclude people with SCD (this 
would include both those who are born with SCD and those whose disabilities arise because of an 
illness, injury or any other cause).  
This section gave an explanatory account of Tempels’ force thesis. In doing so, I highlighted the 
ways in which the theory is ableist. The aforementioned analysis leads me towards the conclusion 
that the force thesis is ableist and for this reason, the theory cannot be accepted as an adequate 
account of a person.   
1. b. Shadow thesis 
Alexis Kagame’s theorisation of personhood comes from a place where he wants to understand 
what muntu is. Kagame notes that “MU=Muntu= a man” indicating the singular is the root element 
of the “BA=Bantu=men” which is the plural of muntu (1989: 35). In attempting to articulate a 
conception of personhood, Kagame’s paper is split into four sections. The first section details the 
nature of muntu, i.e. what muntu is. Kagame contends that a man is –muntu-, by which I understand 
him to be referring to a human being. Kagame is not clear if muntu refers to a person or a human 
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being; my reading of his theory is that muntu refers to a human being. Later he states the point in 
which man becomes a man “i.e. compete in his nature” (ibid.:36). I think that by this, he means to 
say the point in which muntu can be referred to as a person. To ensure that these two distinctions 
are clear; lowercase m, muntu refers to a human being which has the vital principle of animality and 
intelligence. Capital M, Muntu refers to a person, this is a human being who “puts reason to good 
use” (ibid.: 37). (See diagram B - making such a distinction makes his argument easier to follow).  
The second section regards death. Here Kagame argues that death extinguishes the two vital 
principles of Muntu (intelligence and shadow). In the third section, he explores what Muntu’s 
ultimate end is and lastly the relationship that Muntu has with her community. It should be noted 
that Kagame does not dub his theory as the shadow thesis; rather this term comes out of 
Kaphagawani’s (2004: 339) interpretation of Kagame’s paper. The fourth section of Kagame’s 
paper can be read as an attempt to underscore the communal link that Muntu has with the Bantu. 
Earlier I alluded that this link (marked by a blood tie) does not present the shadow thesis as a strong 
communal thesis. As stated by Kagame, Muntu is “an integral part of a family group which is 
composed of its living and deceased members” (1989: 39). That is Muntu does not exist as a lone 
individual, rather in all her existence, she is tied to her family. Considering the aims of this project, 
I focus on the first and third section of Kagame’s paper.  
As stated earlier when Kagame explains what the elements of muntu are, I interpret this question as: 
“what is a human being”. According to Kagame muntu is “animated by a double vital principle: the 
shadow which he shares with the animal, and the vital principle of intelligence” (later Kagame 
makes mention of the heart) (ibid.: 35). Shadow which is the first principle, refers to the vital 
principle of animality, by this he means that muntu is partly an animal. The second principle, 
according to Kagame anchors the difference between muntu and other animals; this is the existence 
of intelligence (which is immortal) and the heart.  
The existence of the shadow, is what muntu has in common with an animal, Kagame states that 
“two senses of sight and hearing are founded in the shadow principle of animality” (ibid.: 36). What 
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I interpret this to mean, is that both muntu and animal have the sense of hearing and sight which 
allows them to engage with their environment as physical bodies. The difference here is that muntu 
possess two internal faculties: intelligence and the heart. Kagame states that these internal faculties 
are not possessed by animals. He writes:  
 “By his intelligence, man accomplishes the three operations impossible to the animal:  
a) to reflect upon the data of his senses;  
b) to compare the facts of knowledge he has acquired;  
c) to invent something new by combining previously acquired knowledge.  
 
The heart integrates all that the interior man is, it harmonises the operations and acquisitions 
of intelligence, by adding to them the acts which other cultures attribute to the will” (ibid.).  
 
According to Tempels the heart refers to muntu’s unique personality i.e. memory, thought, spirit, 
sensation, conscience etc. (ibid.), which makes her different from the next muntu. Kagame further 
adds that the “heart integrates all that the interior man is and harmonises his total behaviour” 
(ibid.). Regarding the principle of intelligence, Kagame does not explain further what the three 
operations mean or why they are important.  
After outlining what the nature of man is, Kagame articulates the point in which muntu becomes 
Muntu, and he notes that there are three divergent views. The first is that Muntu is complete as soon 
there is an umbilical cord between mother and child. The second is that Muntu is complete only 
once they have been named. The last view, which he seems to be in agreement with, is that Muntu 
is complete as soon as they put reason to good use. That is when one says x is a Muntu, according to 
Kagame this refers to a muntu who has the two vital shadows and puts reason to good use. That is, 
it would not be enough for one to reflect, compare and invent. Rather, Kagame requires that Muntu 
must use her intelligence to good use (Kagame does not provide an explanation of what this may 
look like).  
 
 animal        animality: shadow 
 
 
 
muntu     
animality: shadow  
Intelligence and heart  
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If the above reading of Kagame’s theorization of persons is correct, one can acknowledge its merits 
in the area of giving an account of what separates a human being from a human person and an 
animal. It is clear how the argument that the shadow thesis is ableist would be formulated, as it 
would follow the same logic used against Tempels. One can note that the shadow thesis would not 
only deny people with SCD personhood, but they would also be denied the status of human being.  
One can argue that Kagame’s category of reason and intelligence stems from Western Philosophy. 
The influence of Descartes’ dualism seems very visible.  In the second meditation, the meditator 
reflects and meditates on the data of one’s senses. From there on the mediator concludes that she is 
a thinking thing, therefore she must exist. In the words of the meditator: “I think, therefore I am” 
(Descartes, 1996: 18). Furthermore, one can regard Kagame’s view as being closer to Kant’s (see 
Kant (1785, 1781) and Korsgaard (1996)) ethics in which the source of moral value and agency lies 
in rationality. My interpretation of Kagame’s shadow thesis is that it is a conception of personhood 
that seeks to conceive of persons as having a mind (with the capacity of intelligence and putting 
reason to good use) and the body (that is the shadow). Remaining within the scope of this thesis, I 
limit my focus on intelligence and the capacity to put reason to good use. In outlining my argument 
that the shadow thesis is ableist I will not spend much time defining what intelligence is, I explicitly 
use the same understanding of “intelligence” as in section I.a. 
I reject the given capacity of intelligence and reason sketched by Kagame, and contend that it is 
ableist. For instance, suppose there is individual ‘x’ in this community born with Down syndrome. 
Down syndrome is defined as “a chromosomal disorder caused by an error in cell division that 
animality: shadow  
Intelligence and heart  
Putting reason to good use Diagram B 
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results in an extra 21st chromosome” which results [in] cognitive and physical disability (Crosta, 
2016). Typically, individuals with Down syndrome would not have the capacity to ‘reflect, 
compare, invent or put reason to good use’. Since intelligence and reason are the two necessary 
conditions (intelligence and reason, heart + shadow would be necessary and sufficient) for one to be 
considered a Muntu – this would exclude SCD individuals from gaining personhood.  
The question that could be posed for Kagame is: “what happens to an individual with down 
syndrome or any other cognitive disability? Are they still considered a person?” I assume that 
Kagame would admit that individual ‘x’ would not be regarded as a person if they lack intelligence 
and reason. That they would be referred to as ibintu (meaning things in Kinyarwanda), these are 
beings who are without intelligence (Hountondji, 1983: 40). It is for these reasons that one cannot 
accept the shadow thesis’s definition of personhood, for it would exclude people with SCD.   
 
1. c. Normative conception 
I now turn to the normative communitarian thesis and assess whether the theory is inclusive or not. 
The normative communitarian thesis faces far more pressure in ensuring that it is inclusive. I say 
this because it is a normative theory of persons; one that I argue has moral undertones. Any theory 
that is normative should be inclusive since it stretches far beyond the minimalist requirements set 
by the shadow and the force theses that state that intelligence, will, and reason are necessary 
conditions for personhood. The normative conception of persons looks beyond the “presence of 
consciousness, memory, will, soul, rationality, or mental function” (Menkiti, 2004: 326). Put 
simply, it looks beyond the metaphysical definition of persons. Metaphysical conceptions of 
persons provide a set of psychological properties that are necessary for personhood such as 
consciousness, memory, will etc. (the shadow and force thesis is of this sort). Normative 
conceptions, however, argue that there are features that one needs for moral agency, these features 
differentiate a moral person from a non-moral entity.  
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Explained in this manner, an individual “could satisfy all the properties requisite for metaphysical 
personhood and lack all the properties requisite for moral personhood” (Beauchamp, 1999: 310). 
Although Menkiti is not clear whether these metaphysical capacities are necessary for moral 
personhood, it does seem as though these capacities would be necessary. Without this qualifier, his 
theory would not be a theory of persons. Put simply, the presence of the given psychological 
capacities (memory, will and so forth) are necessary but not sufficient for one to be considered a 
moral person (I explore the implications of this further).    
Menkiti’s normative theory of persons is defined by the ontological precedence the community has 
over the individual; of which he argues is a better conception of personhood in contrast to the 
Western conception of personhood, and which he regards as an abstract conception of persons that 
focuses on the physical and psychological features of an individual. Although the normative 
conception of personhood may seem preferable, it is not a sufficient theory of personhood. As I 
show in this section, the set rites of passages given by Menkiti close off the attainment of 
personhood for certain people. 
In outlining the normative communitarian thesis, I draw inspiration from Okot p’Bitek’s article 
“The Sociality of Self” (1985). In this article, p’Bitek highlights the fact that in the African 
community man’s existence is entrenched in the community. Man gets an understanding of who he 
is by the social interactions he embarks on. Therefore, the normative communitarian view of 
persons is not only concerned with the biological make-up of persons. In effect, biological 
characteristics do not grant one personhood rather it is “invoked as a prescriptive ethic of how one 
ought to live her life if she is to be seen as having lived a meaningful and worthwhile life” 
(Matolino, 2014: 33).  This entails that for one to have personhood, one ought to be seen interacting 
with one’s community, whether by subscribing to the norms of the community or fulfilling one’s 
obligations as a member of the community. Such a conception of personhood allows for the 
community to hold the person accountable towards attaining personhood, since according to 
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Menkiti it is the “community which defines the person as persons, not some isolated static quality 
of rationality, will, or memory” (Menkiti, 1984: 172).  
Menkiti concedes that personhood is anchored by the ontological progression that an individual 
human life takes from being a human child into personhood which is characterised by this journey 
from an “it to an it” (see diagram C) (Menkiti, 2004: 324). For Menkiti, the ontological progression 
of personhood is one that is temporal, in other words it “takes place in time” (ibid.) Temporality 
underscores the procedural nature of gaining personhood – one cannot claim to be a person until the 
community grants that human the status of personhood. As Menkiti says, persons move from the 
“present to the past, so that the more of a past one has the more standing a person also has” (ibid.).  
This sentiment is echoed by the Somali proverb that states that “wisdom does not come overnight” 
rather, it is something that happens in time. Two implications can be identified here. The first is that 
biological organs do not make one a person, rather to be a person one must go through a certain 
process that is set by the community. The second is that personhood is primarily located in time, 
therefore time needs to be constantly “considered relevant to the in-gathering of the excellences of 
the person as one goes” (ibid.). That is, the defined social and ritual transformation processes are 
not arbitrary exercises; rather they enable one to attain ‘excellences’. As stated by Menkiti, time 
allows for the moral emergence of a person, it allows for the growth of moral qualities that may 
later be found useful for the human community.  
Yet even though Menkiti’s idea of personhood is deeply embedded in time, time is not the only 
crucial characteristic. Rather, the community also plays a crucial role. The community plays the 
role of both the catalyst as well as the prescriber of the norms. So, for one to transform or perhaps 
to acquire personhood the community becomes the driver of these norms since an individual cannot 
do this on their own. Consequently, Menkiti arrives at this conclusion: personhood is something 
that we can achieve and it is not something that one is born with by virtue of being born human. 
(ibid.: 326).  
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Central to his theory is the notion that an individual has a special relationship with their community 
and this relationship is premised on the idea that for an individual to be regarded a person, they 
need to meet the obligations that are prescribed by the community. According to Menkiti carrying 
out these obligations allows the individual to move from an it-status “of early childhood, marked by 
an absence of moral function, into the person-status […] marked by a widened maturity of ethical 
sense” (ibid. 1984: 176).   Menkiti’s idea is that an individual can gain moral knowledge through 
the various rites of passage; these rites of passage include, for instance, “naming 
ceremonies…puberty…marriage, the producing of children, the taking of titles etc.” (ibid.: 327).  
It (has no moral standing, depersonalised moral standing) 
 
Naming of the child (the act of naming is what starts the personalised moral standing of a child) 
 
Various ceremonies (puberty, adolescence, marriage, childrearing and childbearing, death, so forth) 
 
Ancestry (the person is part of the spirits – so they are part of the living dead) 
 
Nameless dead (the person’s name is forgotten past ancestry) 
 
 It (does not have moral standing; depersonalised standing)  
 
One can infer that a person is an individual who has moved beyond the it-status of depersonalised 
moral standing. To be a person, according to Menkiti’s theorization, means that one must firstly 
accept that the community has ontological and epistemic precedence over the individual. Secondly, 
it means that one must go through certain rites of passage that ensure that one gets fully 
incorporated into the community. These rites of passage/social rituals ensure the moral maturity of 
an individual. So, if Menkiti were to say that Zinhle is a person, this statement would mean that 
Zinhle has moral worth, insofar as she has accepted and cultivated a need to go through the rites of 
passage. Menkiti states that “morality ought to be considered as essential to our sense of persons 
[…] an agent is bound to [feel] incomplete in violating its rules” (ibid.: 176- 177).  
Diagram C 
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I conceptualise Menkiti’s theory of persons as the Expectative Morality Model of Personhood14. I 
dub the normative ethic as the expectative model of personhood because it pertains to the 
expectations that one should meet to gain personhood. That is, meeting the expectations gives one 
the capacity for moral worth which is made most evident by the explicit exercise of one’s duty to 
the community. To which Menkiti claims are “duties of justice towards others in the ongoing 
relationships of everyday life” (ibid.: 177). When Menkiti states that the normative account of 
persons entails that one is worthy of moral status, by this I understand him to be implying that being 
worthy of moral consideration depends on meeting the moral obligations prescribed by the 
community. One is denied the status of persons, if one fails to fulfil the expected obligations; 
therefore, one has no moral worth. Put differently: for x to be a person, x must fulfil the moral 
obligations that are set by society. If x fulfils these moral obligations, then x is a person. If x fails at 
meeting these obligations, then x is not a person and cannot have any moral worth. Polycarp 
Ikuenobe reminds us that meeting the set moral obligations prescribed by the community depends 
on “the idea that a person has a mind, is metaphysically free, is capable of rational, voluntary, and 
moral agency, and hence one can be ascribed moral responsibility. Without this assumption about a 
person, one cannot contribute to a community and there will be no basis for evaluating one for 
communal recognition” (2006: 52).    
If my reading of Menkiti is correct, it appears that expectations and morality are compatible. That 
is, in participating in the rites of passage one gains moral worth, that entails a moral obligation 
towards the community. So, if one does not meet the expectations, one cannot be spoken of as a 
moral person. Equally, to be a moral person, one must fulfil the communal obligations. A tension 
arises here: does this mean that individuals who cannot meet the expectations set by the community 
                                                
14 In a paper entitled “Personhood: Social Approval or a Unique Identity” (2011), Mpho Tshivhase 
breaks down Masolo’s conception of personhood into two models. The first is the morality model 
which Masolo discusses; this model states that person should exhibit certain moral qualities that 
advance the good of the community always before one’s own. Tshivhase argues that there is a 
second model of personhood, which she dubs as the expectations model of personhood. I think that 
Menkiti’s theory can be best articulated as the expectative morality model.  
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are not regarded as persons and not worthy of moral consideration? In short, Menkiti would say that 
failure at meeting the obligations would mean that they are not persons.  
In the second section, I use the expectative morality model of persons to illustrate how the 
normative conception of persons has a gender bias, is ableist and anti-queer. I contend that the 
theory asks intersex people and queer people to fulfil obligations that they naturally cannot. I will 
illustrate this by looking at the given rites of passage that allow for the development of personhood.  
I argue that the rite of ‘producing children’ is anti-queer; this is because such a rite of passage 
requires one to perform a task that is outside of the abilities of those that are queer. Equally, the rite 
highlights the ways in which the normative conception of persons is ableist, in so far as infertile 
individuals cannot participate in such a rite (this argument is explored further). The ableist nature of 
the normative ethic is also observable in the requisite attitudes (having a mind, being rational etc.) 
that allow for the evaluation for communal recognition as stated by Ikuenobe. I detail this argument 
in section II.c. where I argue that individuals with SCD are closed off from participating in the 
given rites of passage.   
Up to this point, this section has highlighted that there are potential grounds to argue that the 
studied communitarian conceptions of personhood are exclusionary towards certain genders in a 
discriminatory manner, including people with disabilities, and queer people. All that was needed 
was to indicate that the theories need not be exclusive to all (gender, people with disabilities and 
queer people), rather that if a theory is exclusive even to one of the identified group it would be 
sufficient to reject that theory as a plausible account of personhood.  
Closing remarks:  
So far, I have shown how the prominent theories of personhood define persons. In the process, I 
indicated the ways in which they show themselves to have a gender bias, are anti-queer or ableist. 
Before drawing this section to a close let me mention some important questions that I have not been 
able to cover.  
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In this theorisation of persons, Tempels outlines the hierarchy of force. Within this hierarchy (see 
diagram B) one can note that second to God are the ‘archpatriarchs, of which we are told are the 
forefathers of man whom God communicated her vital force with. Tempels neglects to provide a 
workable definition of the term, but we are informed that these are men. One is then inclined to ask 
the grounds in which Tempels makes such a disclaimer? As a female living in this community, how 
much of this hierarchy would influence my very own force? As interesting as these questions may 
be, the scope of my dissertation is not to unpack force and so these questions are not dealt with.   
 
Section II: Objections and Responses  
I now turn to some possible objections that can be advanced against my reading that the studied 
communitarian conceptions of personhood are exclusive either to certain genders, people with 
disabilities or queer people. To each objection I provide a response, the success of each response 
will allow me to assess whether there are grounds to advance these claims. If I am successful at this, 
then I would have satisfactorily demonstrated that the African conceptions of personhood sketched 
in the first section of this dissertation have a gender bias, are anti-queer or ableist.  
As I suggested earlier, the normative communitarian faces far more pressure in ensuring that his or 
her conception of personhood is inclusive because it is normative, and so the normative 
communitarian will be judged more severely. In my mind, the set criteria for inclusivity should 
have been considered by the defenders and friends of communitarianism in their continued 
engagement with the theory. These objections are broken down into three sections namely: ‘the 
argument for fluidity’; ‘the argument that homosexuality is harmful’; lastly ‘the argument that 
ableism is ‘unAfrican’.  
In reading this section, the reader should be aware that my criticisms are directed towards elements 
of communal thought, which as reported by Menkiti take precedence over “individual life histories 
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whatever these may be. And this primacy is meant to apply not only ontologically, but also in 
regard to epistemic accessibility” (1984: 171). Said differently, I am arguing from the position that 
our social world does in fact contain non-abled bodied people and queer people, and it is 
characterised by patriarchal oppression.   
II. a. ‘the argument for fluidity’ 
In this section, I advance the argument that the normative conception of personhood is gendered in 
a discriminatory manner. I illustrate this point by assessing the rites of passage that allow for social 
incorporation and the procedural attainment of personhood. I show how these passages would close 
off the possibility for personhood for intersex individuals. Thereafter, I provide objections that may 
be advanced; first I give an objection that speaks to the problem of arguing that normative 
conceptions of personhood have a gender bias. Secondly, I articulate an objection that may be 
advanced by Menkiti. To each objection, I provide a response.     
1.1. The relational nature of personhood 
The normative worldview of persons has a binary conception of gender, and as a result, it 
discriminates against intersex people. I draw my critique from Oristsegbubemi A. Oyowe and Olga 
Yurkivska’s article “Can a communitarian concept of African personhood be both relational and 
gender-neutral?” (2014). My aims are to indicate how the normative relational nature of personhood 
allows for such discriminations. Below I underscore the nature in which the normative 
communitarian conception of persons is relational, by virtue of the fact that the individual has an 
ontological relationship with their community where the self is constituted by the special 
relationship that they have with the community. 
In reading Menkiti in this light, Oyowe and Yurkivska argue that “the acquisition of personhood is 
simultaneously an acquisition of gender-identity, and personhood cannot be reduced to its 
ontological, epistemological or ethical components, they are organically interwoven” (2014: 90). 
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By this I understand the authors to be saying that personhood cannot be understood as an abstract 
concept. That is personhood is not an isolated concept, as one would understand rationality. Rather, 
personhood concerns an individual’s social standing, in relation to the existing social relationships 
within a set community.  
A point I suspect Menkiti would agree with, he may probably state that, in ordinary life one is 
simultaneously, say, someone with a gender identity, sexual preference, various abilities and 
disabilities. So, even if one necessarily has some sort of gender identity, this does not entail that it is 
an error to conceive of one’s personhood as relating only to “ontological, epistemological or 
ethical” qualities. (By analogy, for Descartes, clearly, he had a body and a mind simultaneously, but 
there is nothing obviously in error about his view that his personhood essentially resided in his 
having a mind – the body was incidental).  
In arguing that the normative communitarian conception of persons is gendered, Oyowe and 
Yurkivska (2014) make three claims that ground their critique, namely; (1) ‘rootedness in the 
community’, (2) ‘processual nature of personhood’ and (3) ‘normative nature of personhood’:  
(1) Rootedness in the community:  
Rootedness in community refers to the way communitarianism construes personhood as being 
socio-centric in so far as “the status of an individual is determined through some cultural criteria; 
persons are defined and individuated communally and the individual does not and cannot exist 
alone except corporately…he owes his existence to other people.” (Kaphagawani, (2000: 173); 
Tempels, (1989: 58) and Mbiti, (1969: 108) cited in Oyowe and Yurkivska, 2014: 89).  
One would recall that Menkiti argues for the ontological primacy that the community has over an 
individual. Meaning that “being a person among other persons is what one is […] and that is how 
one can be known to others and known to oneself” (ibid.: 88). Personhood requires the capacity for 
reflex self-awareness. Reflex self-awareness allows for the individual to make a statement like “I 
am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am” (Mbiti, 1970). So, the normative conception 
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of persons assumes that an individual must consciously regard themselves as a participating 
member (Flikschuh, 2016: 5).   
Ikuenobe argues that this relationship characterises a relational relationship between an individual 
and their community. It is marked by an individual who internalises the moral standards that are 
subscribed by the community. These moral standards are external to the individual because the 
individual did not set the standards themselves. Meaning that the moral principles that are 
subscribed by the community become a marker on which the individual chooses “freely, acts and 
forms [their] identity or idea of self- as defined by [their] internalised values, choices and actions” 
(Ikuenobe, 2015:1006). These moral principles influence the social relations that exist in a 
community; hence they will also influence how individuals form their identity. An individual is a 
person in virtue of upholding moral norms that the community has set for them (whatever these 
moral norms may be, ranging from puberty to marriage). One cannot be a person unless they 
subscribe to these norms15. 
(2) Processual nature of personhood:  
The second claim refers to the processual nature of personhood. This refers to Menkiti’s idea of 
how one acquires personhood through the various rites of passage; where an individual is the 
subject of “social and ritual transformation” (Menkiti, 1984: 172). Oyowe and Yurkivska claim that 
the processual nature of personhood indicates the manner in which the community socialises one 
into personhood. The authors argue that this socialisation process is mediated “through rules and 
rituals of transformation” (Oyowe and Yurkivska, 2014: 89), that will ensure that an individual can 
develop a sense of community and understand that they have obligations and responsibilities 
towards not only their immediate family but to their community as well.  
                                                
15  As noted by Ikuenobe, the normative view of a person presupposes that a person is 
metaphysically free, meaning that the person has a mind, and they are rational. By being 
metaphysically free the normative conception of a person also assumes moral responsibility to the 
person (hence I dubbed it as an expectative morality model of personhood), meaning that one 
cannot be referred to as being a person unless they have satisfied the set normative criteria 
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(3) Normative nature of personhood:  
The last claim refers to the normative nature of personhood; here the authors highlight the emphasis 
that the normative communitarian places on exhibiting ethical maturity and behaviour that is 
appropriate to one’s position in the community. Recall, that Menkiti states that personhood is 
something that one attains and failure to conform to the community’s norms may result in either 
losing or not gaining personhood at all.    
The purpose of the preceding paragraphs was to highlight the manner in which the attainment or 
failure of personhood is marked by an interaction between an individual and the community. As 
stated by Matolino if we are without a community, we would be unable to come up with a 
conception of self or anything at all (2014: 57). The point is that as individuals interact with their 
communities in order to gain personhood, the procedural nature of this journey informs whether the 
opportunity for personhood is closed off or open, say, for an intersex individual. When arguing that 
the normative communitarian ethic is gendered, I will show how the gendered nature of the ethic 
results from its relationality. My interests are the rites of passage prescribed by Menkiti, more 
specifically on the gendered nature of his conception of personhood. Secondly, I take interest in the 
passage of childbearing/producing children which I take to be anti-queer and reduces the being of 
intersex individuals. I believe that queer individuals would be unable to participate in the ceremony 
of producing children (I explore this idea further in the second section of this chapter). It is from 
this observation that one can infer that the normative conception of a person is both anti-queer and 
gendered. 
One will recall that Menkiti states that ‘rites of passage’ are the anchors of personhood; these rites 
of passage would differ for males and females. Men and women gain their personhood differently 
based on the expected roles that they need to fulfil in the community. For instance, boys and girls 
are socialized differently. And so, to be a person cannot be read outside of the relationships that one 
has with their community, as Oyowe and Yurkivska put it:   
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“to be a person, by definition, is to be related, i.e. placed within a complex web of communal social 
relationships and the latter are gendered. The ontological conception of personhood then 
encompassed not only social and moral but also gender order, and the latter is of paramount 
importance in traditional African societies. All this leads to the conclusion that, given (1) 
ontological rootedness of persons in the community and (2) the gendered nature of African values, 
the former (ontological rootedness) necessarily carries the features of gender” (ibid.: 92-93).  
 
1.2. Rites of passage have an inherent gender bias: the case of an intersex individual 
So far, there seems to be nothing controversial regarding these claims. I have expressed in the 
beginning of this section that Menkiti would probably agree that the normative ethic is gendered, 
although he would argue that its gendered nature does not discriminate against any gender. In fact, 
he would say that the rites of passage all require something of each gender. That is both females and 
males are expected to go through puberty and there are set expectations that they would also have to 
meet. Such a view is expressed by Ifi Amadiume in Male daughters, female husbands: Gender and 
Sex in an African Society where she argues that the gendered nature of personhood is one that 
ensures that there is complementarity between males and females.  
It goes without saying that the argument for gender complementarity is one that takes gender to be 
binary. That is, one is either female or male and there is no in-between. The shortfall of such a view 
is that it does not recognise the fluid constructions of gender. According to Butler, “gender is not a 
fact, the various acts of gender creates the idea of gender, and without those acts, there would be no 
gender at all” (1988: 522). In what follows I present the case of an intersex individual. Medically, 
intersexuality is referred to as hermaphroditism which refers to an individual born with ambiguous 
genitalia, making it hard for their sex to be categorised as either male or female. Intersexuality then 
challenges “our instance that biological gender is unequivocally binary” (Garland-Thomson 2002: 
14). There are commonly two types of hermaphrodites: pseudo-hermaphrodites (individuals who 
have “either ovaries or testes combined with the opposite genitalia) and true hermaphrodites 
(individuals with “an ovary and a testis, or a combined gonad, called an ovo-testis” (Sterling, 2000: 
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38). Anne Fausto-Sterling notes that true hermaphroditism is more common, which has six 
categories (See diagram D). 
Theoretically, intersex people who have a functioning uterus and ovaries should be able to bear 
children. Yet Sterling notes that this has been unheard of, as true hermaphrodites often have 
incomplete reproductive organs.  
Having defined what intersexuality is, I now present the case of Mogadi Caster Semenya (this 
account is not autobiographical or an auto-ethnographic account of Semenya’s life). Semenya is a 
South African athlete who was medically diagnosed as an Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS) 
hermaphrodite. Semenya was born in 1991, in Limpopo, whose birth certificate reads female; the 
athlete was brought up as such. 
Semenya’s father shares that “from the time she could walk, Caster only wanted to play with boys 
[…] Her three elder sisters wore dresses, as little girls do, but Caster refused. She has never had a 
skirt, only trousers. I knew she was different to the others, and even now if you speak to her on the 
telephone you might mistake her for a man” (Jacob Semenya quoted in Malone et al. 2009). 
Semenya’s father further shares that his child never showed romantic interest in boys. The 
biographical article by Malone et al. notes that Semenya preferred playing sports like football, 
wrestling and karate with male friends. 
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The purpose of sharing Semenya’s narrative was to highlight how African communities assume a 
binary conception of gender; one must be either male or female (I advance this claim further). For 
instance, Semenya’s headmaster assumed that Semenya was a male pupil because Semenya was 
interested in soccer and wore trousers to school, he shares that “it was only in Grade 11 that I 
realised she was a girl” (Eric Modiba quoted in Malone et al. 2009). Deborah Morolong described 
as a female friend by Malone et al.  shares that Semenya “doesn’t like boys. But that doesn’t mean 
she is not a girl” (ibid.). From the comments that are shared by Semenya’s father, we note the 
Semenya was raised/regarded as a female. Interestingly, Semenya’s father shares that Semenya only 
Diagram D: Source: Fausto-Sterling 
(2000:52) 
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wanted to play with boys. What I observe from the comments made by Semenya’s father was that 
he was accepting of his child even though Semenya was interested in ‘masculine sports’.  
I imagine that the communitarian would say something like “you see! Communitarianism is 
accepting of intersex individuals!”. Here the communitarian may go as far as arguing that rather 
than not being permitted into a status as “a person”, an intersex individual would be socialized into 
personhood. But they would need to add that they only accept them insofar as they (intersexual 
people) perform an established binary gender identity. But I would caution the communitarian, as 
such excitement would be premature, even though Semenya may be accepted as a ‘masculine 
female’ in the community and perhaps be socialized into the status of persons.  As an AIS intersex, 
Semenya would not meet the expected rites of passage. Theoretically, she would not experience 
mensuration; Semenya is not attracted to the male sex, rather she is sexually attracted to females; 
Semenya is unlikely to have biological children. One will recall that Menkiti defines the rite of 
childbearing as ‘producing children’, which I take to be different from that of childrearing. 
Semantically, the act of producing children is synonymous to that of childbearing. The Cambridge 
Dictionary defines produces as ‘make’. The example given is: “When animals produce young, they 
give birth to them […] Our cat produced four kittens during the course of the night”16. And so, an 
intersex individual would not be able to produce a child in this manner and so they cannot be 
socialized into personhood. In the paragraphs that follow, one will notice that even the rite of 
puberty potentially closes off the attainment of personhood for an intersex individual. My point is 
that even if we recognise the existence of intersex people, they may still fail to fulfil their 
communal expectations (for whatever reason), and in this case, they would not be regarded as 
persons by the communitarian. 
The philosophical argument is that as an intersex individual Semenya would not be able to meet the 
set communal obligations of the Traditional African community and therefore, Semenya would be 
                                                
16  Cambridge Dictionary. http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/produce. Accessed: 
19.07.2017.   
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denied the status of personhood. To illustrate how this would play out in a set African community 
(whether they are matriarchal or patriarchal) I will consider a few of the rites of passage that 
Menkiti assumes are a necessary process for one to be incorporated into personhood.   
Tasha Davis (2011) informs us that rites of passages have a double purpose; first, they ensure that 
there is a sense of collective mortality in the community. Secondly, they link the individual to their 
community; they ensure that an individual actively participates in the community, and is not a mere 
observer (Bujo, 2001:35). Noting Menkiti’s failure to explain the significance of the rites of 
passage, I ground the analysis on the explanation given by Davis. I consider two of the rites of 
passage provided by Menkiti namely; the rite of puberty and the rite of producing children. 
Considering all the rites of passage given by Menkiti, I take it that the two rites that I explore 
bellow place emphasis on two genders and in the process close of the option for a third/alternative 
gender to participate in the social transformation necessary for personhood. 
(1) puberty and the ceremonies, which mark an entry into young adult 
The rite of adulthood often follows puberty. Puberty thus serves as the entry into adulthood; 
individuals in this process are prepared for the responsibilities and obligations that they should 
fulfil. The ceremonies that mark the entry into puberty and adulthood are different for men and 
women. Davis writes that appropriate behaviours for women and men are articulated and each 
gender “receive[s] further clarification of his or her purpose or life mission” (ibid.). The completion 
of this rite is often celebrated in public spaces.  
Commonly, puberty for females is marked by physical body change (e.g. menstruation, the 
development of breast, pubic hair and so forth). The same can be said for males (e.g. the 
enlargement of their scrotum and tests, the ability to ejaculate, deepening of a voice and so forth). 
All these entries happen at various times for all individuals. But in the case of an intersex 
individual, such changes are complicated. As I mentioned earlier, as an AIS intersex Semenya is 
unlikely to begin menstruating. We hear from Semenya’s father that Semenya sounds like a man – 
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so Semenya’s voice broke, which is unusual for a female child. Because the rite of puberty is 
determined by the gender that one is ascribed at birth, as an intersex individual, Semenya would not 
unable to participate in the rite of passage. Because during this stage changes that occur may be a 
combination of male and female changes (see basic clinical features in diagram C).   
(2) the producing of children  
According to Davis, the rite of producing children is one of the most important rites. Producing 
children ensures that the community will grow and that children will carry the legacy of the 
community (Davis, 2011.). Bujo argues that “begetting and giving birth re-establishes the legacy of 
the ancestors” (2001:35). By this, he means that when one gives birth to a child, the child becomes 
a memory of their parents. Said differently, once the parents of the child die, the child has a duty to 
keep the memory of their parents and the community alive. He states that the rite of producing 
children is both beneficial for the individual and the community. Lastly, he adds that the “worst 
death is to die childless” (ibid.: 36). Both Kagame (1989:39) and Tempels (1959: 50) in their 
theorisation of persons make mention of the importance of childbearing. Defined in this manner, 
one can conclude that this rite assumes heteronormativity – it holds the assumption that there are 
only two genders (female and male) which have natural roles in the community. 
What I sought to illustrate in the proceeding paragraphs is how these rites of passage assume a 
binary conception of gender. This draws me to the conclusion that these rites are discriminatory - 
discriminatory towards intersex people. The stronger claim made here lies in the rite of producing 
children. If we accept the arguments made below that Traditional African communities are 
genderless, the rite of producing children disproves this claim. The act of producing children 
presupposes that two opposite cisgenders must have sexual intercourse for a child to be born. Of 
course, the logic in the argument assumes that these two genders are capable of having a child (i.e. 
be fertile). It appears to me that out of all the given rites of passage, producing children is 
important. A community that does not bear children will not grow; there will be no one to carry the 
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memory of those living once they are dead. Even if the communitarian were to ensure that the other 
rites are gender neutral, say giving children a gender-neutral name. It appears that the rite of 
producing children is exclusionary.   
The problem arises because the conception of personhood that Menkiti provides us with assumes 
compulsory heterosexuality and heteronormativity. Earlier I suggested that Menkiti’s theory is an 
expectative morality model of personhood. Considering the two rites of passage, I concluded that 
these are discriminatory to intersex people. In pursuant to the expectative morality model of 
personhood, intersex people would not be granted the status of person. First, because they would 
not be able to meet the two identified expectations set because they don’t meet the expectations, and 
so the capacity for personhood is closed off for them.  
1.3. Caution:  gender is a concept imposed on African communities. 
Scholars like Nkiru Uwechia Nzegwu (2006), Ifa Amadiume, Keletso Atkins (1993) and Oyeronke 
Oyewumi (1997) may strongly disagree with the arguments presented in this section. Nzegwu, 
Atkins, Amadiume and Oyewumi rightly so, argue that a gendered critique of African conceptions 
of personhood as gendered fails to recognise how gender as a concept was imposed on African 
communities. Nzegwu asserts that colonisation (and other major historical events) has had a huge 
impact on gender roles and gender performativity and this complicates how we think of gender. In 
the introductory paragraphs of Family Matters: Feminist Concepts in African Philosophy of 
Culture, Nzegwu poses this question: “So what if the category of gender is absent in certain 
cultures?” (2006: 9). In answering this question, Nzegwu argues that there “is a need for caution in 
discussing ungendered societies in a gendered framework” (ibid.: 10).  Equally Oyewumi states:  
“In African studies, historically and currently, the creation and constitution, and production of 
knowledge have remained the privilege of the West. Therefore, body-reasoning and the bio-logic 
that derives from the biological determinism inherent in Western thought have been imposed on 
African societies. The presence of gender constructs cannot be separated from the ideology of 
biological determinism. Western conceptual schemes and theories have become so widespread that 
almost all scholarship, even by Africans, utilises them unquestionably” (1997: x) 
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The quote by Oyewumi echoes the thoughts that are made by Nzegwu. The impression that is given 
here is that bringing up the question of gender according to these authors would be applying a 
Western praxis which would not only be naïve but also guilty of imposing a Western episteme.  My 
suspicion is that Menkiti would agree with Nzegwu, Amadiume, Oyewumi, in insofar as his theory 
makes no mention that only a particular gender can meet certain rites, for instance, anyone can be 
named or take up titles etc.  
Whilst I acknowledge that there is a problem with applying a Western feminist outlook towards 
Traditional African societies. I take it that this approach may be limiting (in the literal sense, 
limiting because fewer approaches are considered), insofar as it assumes that feminism has no place 
in African societies. Furthermore, in refraining from having a gendered approach towards 
understanding Traditional African societies and the nature of personhood (as this project aims to 
understand) – we deprive ourselves of engaging with the content of this project in a critical manner.  
Borrowing from Agnes Atia Apusigah such thoughts are dangerous in so far as they include the 
“premature closure of discourse” (2008: 34). That is, they treat gender difference as a static issue, 
and close off the possibility of dialogue across disciplines. Furthermore, Apusigah states that there 
is the “romanization of ethnic cultures” (ibid.: 41), where scholars are protective of their cultures, as 
one can see in both Amadiume and Oyewumi’s work. Part of the problem with such views is that 
they are relativist. Importantly, a distinction should be made between the assumed role that 
colonialism played in rites of passage vis–à–vis changing the economic and political landscape of 
these communities, which I think Amadiume fails to do.  
Fundamentally, I am not in disagreement with the sentiments made by Nzegwu, Atkins, Amadiume 
and Oyewumi. I think that it is wrong to impose gender categories to societies that seem to be 
gender-neutral. However, considering the normative communitarian ethic, the very nature of the 
rites of passage is gendered and this is not an imposition. The stronger argument that I presented in 
this section speaks to this, from a conceptual point of view, these rites of passage seem to close off 
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any possibility for a third, fourth/alternative gender that does not fall within the two genders i.e. 
male and female that inform these rites.    
1.4. The argument for fluidity  
In responding to the claim that the normative communitarian conception of persons has an inherent 
gender bias and as a result would be discriminatory to intersex people or it is anti-queer. I suspect 
that scholars who defend communitarianism and perhaps even Menkiti himself may argue that my 
claims are misguided. They may argue that the normative conception of personhood is fluid and 
thus gendered in a non-discriminatory manner. Menkiti could probably state that what makes his 
conception fluid is that it is not concerned about the biological make-up of persons, rather its 
primary concern lies with a person’s moral standing within the community.  
In the second paragraph of his paper, Menkiti argues that “the African view of man denies that 
persons can be defined by focusing on this or that physical or psychological characteristic of the 
lone individual” (1984: 171). That is, the acquisition of personhood is about participating in the 
various ceremonies of one’s community; these ceremonies include “marriage, the producing of 
children, the taking of titles, etc. Finally, they will arrive old age and elderhood, and after 
elderhood, ancestorhood” (Menkiti, 2004:327). Furthermore, Menkiti argues that “in examining the 
moral sense in the definition of the person within the African context, let me add that the traditional 
understanding in this area is something which makes great deal of sense given the special worth 
attached to person […] John Rawls makes explicit part of what is meant by the general ethical 
requirement of respect to persons, noting that those who are capable of a sense of justice are owed 
duties of justice, with this capability constructed in its sense of a potentiality which may or may not 
be realised” (ibid.: 330).   
So, Menkiti would argue that his conception of a person would require us to respect the different 
kinds of human beings that exist in society, in noting that a human being is a person insofar as they 
respect the moral norms of the community. The plausible objection given by Menkiti would be that 
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his theory does not place as much focus on the given rites of passages as I have done, rather his 
theory places primacy on moral norms which can be changed. Hence, he could argue that his theory 
is fluid. Furthermore, that what matters is the movement that an individual takes in gaining 
personhood, a movement that happens in time. Menkiti argues that time ought to be considered 
“relevant to the in-gathering of the excellences of the person as one ages” (2004:325). Simply put, 
what is important is that a community ought to have norms that drive the journey of personhood, 
these norms are not stagnant. Moreover, that the given rites of passages are an example of moral 
norms that a community could consider as important, yet these are not cast in stone.  
I don’t think that the given argument by the communitarian stands on strong grounds, granted that 
norms are important and that personhood is something that is gained in time. The shortfall of 
Menkiti’s theory is that he lists certain rites of passage; rites of passage that I have indicated are 
exclusionary. If Menkiti wanted to stress the importance of norms, I contend that this could have 
been achieved without listing rites of passages. Menkiti could have given norms that require 
participation that on their own can happen through time. Participation is not dependent on one’s 
sexuality, gender and ability 
 
The point is that the rites of passage that are prescribed by the community that grants one 
personhood may be oppressive to certain individuals namely, those who are living with some form 
of disability (as I will show in the next section), and of course to intersexual individuals. Whilst 
these norms are important, as they set the guiding principles of a community, for without norms the 
community may result to anarchy – their very nature is exclusionary. Butler argues that norms have 
a double nature, whilst we cannot do without them, we also do not have to “assume that their form 
is given and fixed. Indeed, even if we cannot do without them, it will be seen that we also cannot 
accept them as they are” (Butler, 2004: 207). The quote by Butler captures my thoughts. Granted 
that these norms are important if their nature is oppressive in anyway, they must be changed.  
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In this section, I indicated how the normative conception of personhood has an inherent gender bias, 
a bias that places emphasis on the two genders and discriminates against intersex people. The 
gender bias is observable in the given rites of puberty and producing children that close off the 
possibility of personhood to individuals who do not fit into either of the two genders. Thereafter I 
presented the two objections, where the first cautions the imposition of gender to communities that 
were gender neutral. Second was the argument that norms are not fixed and hence conceptions of 
persons are fluid. My aims for this section were to highlight that Menkiti would be wrong in stating 
that his communitarian ethic is not gendered in a discriminatory manner. If the communitarian 
accepts the reading of his ethic as the expectative morality model of persons as I dubbed his theory 
earlier – he still needs to tell us why being a person is dependent on obligations that are centred 
around one’s gender or sexuality.          
 
 
II. b. ‘the argument that homosexuality is harmful’ 
I ask myself, “What is it that women who are married to men have that I don’t have?” (Ciru, a 
Gikuyu woman who’s married to another woman – cited in Njambi and O’Brien, 2005: 145)  
 
Literature within African sexualities informs us that homosexuality in Africa pre-colonialism was 
not a taboo, which is contrary to some of the views that Western literature makes. Busangokwakhe 
Dlamini amongst other scholars argues that it was colonialism that brought the criminalization of 
homosexuality (through penal codes), thereby casting it as a negative identity (2006: 67).  In Africa 
Writes Back to Self: Metafiction, Gender, Sexuality (2009), Evan Maina Mwangi traces how queer 
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identities have been written about in African literature by way of indicating that homosexuality is 
not new nor is it a taboo in Africa17.   
In the preceding section, I alluded to the fact that the rite of producing children is anti-queer, 
because the rite presupposes heterosexuality and heteronormativity. I will not explain this rite at 
length as this was done in section II. a. It is worthwhile to inform the reader that queer individuals, 
are sexually attracted to either the same sex as theirs, or have fluid sexual identities. Say one who 
may be attracted to a male, as a male individual or to a female as a female individual, or may be 
attracted to both (see footnote 1). Considering the argument that I advance, I will focus on 
homosexuality as a queer identity.  
Homosexuals are defined as individuals who are sexually attracted to the same sex as theirs. Thabo 
Msibi better articulates it as “same-sex-desiring individuals” (2011: 57). In this kind of relationship, 
it would be unlikely for such a couple to have a child. Of course, because of technological 
advancements today such couples can have children with the aid of reproductive technologies. But 
one will recall that I limited the scope of this project to Traditional African societies where 
reproductive technologies were arguably not an option. It is further worthwhile to remind the reader 
that when talking about the rite of producing children, such a rite is not synonymous to childrearing 
(see section II.a.). Childrearing refers to the process of raising children; rather the rite refers to 
childbearing, which is understood as the biological reproduction of a child.  
Having said that, homosexual individuals are not incapable of childbearing outside of their sexual 
preferences, unless if they were infertile. It is their sexual preference that would hinder them from 
producing children within their sexual orientation. Since the normative communitarian argues that 
                                                
17 The claims presented here are not synonymous with the idea that homosexuality is unAfrican, 
rather they come from a place of understanding homosexuality as causing harm. 
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the rite of producing children amongst others is important for personhood. The argument is that this 
requirement is anti-queer/homophobic18.  
The aim of this section is to advance the plausible objection that can be put forth by the 
communitarian that his conception of persons is not anti-queer. The plausible objection that is 
explored is presented as a contemporary philosophical argument that has been advanced within 
African philosophy. I argue that such an argument should be rejected. Fundamentally, the only 
difference between a heterosexual individual and a homosexual individual is their sexual orientation 
(Rachels, 1999: 50). I think that the communitarian does not give enough grounds to deny the latter 
personhood. It is unclear to me how failing to produce children makes one not worthy of 
personhood. The communitarian is mistaken in thinking that personhood can only be found in the 
actual participation of the set rituals of incorporation.  
1.1.The harm of homosexuality  
I now turn to the argument that homosexuality is harmful, this argument is presented as a plausible 
justification by the communitarian as to why they would deny queer individuals personhood.  
Matolino makes us aware that this argument is made from the idea of harm where the resistance of 
homosexuality is believed to violate the “basic principles and beliefs of African reality” (Matolino, 
119). 
According to Matolino (10), responsible behaviour means that the individual ought to “construct 
and build her community in ways that promote the survival of the community as well as 
maintaining its harmony […the individual needs to] equally understand the importance of 
continuing the cycle of life by leaving offspring on this earth”. In citing Menkiti, Matolino reminds 
                                                
18Homophobia is defined as “dislike of or prejudice against homosexual people”.  The point being 
made here is that communitarians could argue that they are not homophobic, for they do not dislike 
homosexuals. Rather that homosexuality brings harm to the community  
19 Unpublished article.  
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us that “one who behaves in contrast to the stipulated communal norms and expectations is deemed 
a[s] having failed at the project of personhood” (Matolino, 8).  
The objection to homosexuality would be that since same-sex (e.g. two females) couples cannot 
participate in the act of bearing children, an act that ensures the continuation of their community, 
consequently they bring harm to the community. Homosexuality is harmful insofar as it will not 
ensure that there are offspring in the community, therefore one is doing harm by not participating in 
some of the basic requirements of what makes one a person (recall Bujo’s statement that: “the worst 
death is to die childless” (2000: 36)). Proponents of this view would remind us that one of the 
ceremonies that grant one personhood is childbearing. Childbearing, according to Menkiti, is one of 
the “excellences” (1984: 173), which form part of the expected moral conduct of an individual 
which is expected by one’s community. Thus, childbearing is a necessary condition for personhood. 
We note that proponents of this view would agree with my claims that the communitarian 
conception of personhood is anti-queer, yet they would want to defend this claim by stating that it is 
anti-queer for practical reasons.  
Argument from Normative Traditionalism 
 P1. Failing to procreate is harmful to the common good.  
 P2. Any individual who fails to procreate cannot be granted personhood 
 P3. The sexual preferences of homosexual individuals disable them from procreating 
\   Homosexuals cannot be conferred the status of personhood because their sexual 
preferences (in heterosexist societies) are harmful to the common good.  
Said differently, the objectionable practice of homosexuality would be that “it violates two 
important principles of life. The first and most obvious principle is that the homosexual does not 
add to the creative process of the life. The ultimate act of this creative process is producing young, 
bringing young up and perpetuating the cycle of life” (Matolino: 10). It is on these grounds that the 
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normative traditionalist would deny a homosexual personhood because they commit P1. The 
justification for P1 would be: by not having children homosexuals are in serious way “harming the 
society by refusing20 to participate in its basic and most important requirement for the individual” 
(ibid.: 10).  
Interestingly, one could further identify other ‘acts’ that could bring about harm to the community 
and this would invalidate the arguments that communitarians are anti-queer because of ‘harm’. Case 
in point, infertile women and men, would also bring about harm to the community. In so far as they 
would not be able to continue the cycle of life by leaving off-springs to the community, thereby 
committing P1.  
I think that the argument that homosexuality is harmful also exposes the ableist nature of the 
communitarian. One can argue that infertility is a disability. David Orentlicher argues that infertile 
people can meet the definition of disability “because they have an impairment of their reproductive 
tracts (e.g. scarred fallopian tubes) that substantially limits the major life activity of procreation” 
(2010: 156). Since the communitarian thinks that the act of producing children is a necessary 
condition for personhood, any individual who fails to meet this condition cannot be considered as 
persons. On this view homosexuals, infertile people and intersex individuals cannot be granted 
personhood. 
Without fail the argument from ‘harm’ is deeply anti-queer because it assumes that homosexuals 
‘choose’ to be gay, this argument does not recognise that homosexuality, along with heterosexuality 
is arguably not a choice rather it is biological. This argument assumes that homosexuals 
intentionally go out of their way to bring about harm to the community.  So, primary to the response 
should be an assessment of intention. That is, proponents of this view need to ask themselves if 
                                                
20 I think that the word refuse comes with a lot of contention. Although Matolino explains that there 
is some choice, he writes that “one can really be oriented as homosexual but take up that 
responsibility” (Matolino, 10). His use of the word choice and refuse somewhat reinforces 
heteronormativity, which is problematic.  
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‘homosexuals intend to bring harm to the community’; conversely they also need to ask if 
‘heterosexuals intentionally aim to bring about good to the community? Or if their sexuality is a 
matter of moral luck for them?’ I agree with Matolino’s statement that the argument that 
homosexuality is harmful represents “common pettiness and prejudice” (Matolino, 1). Prejudice 
because the arguments presented are made from a gaze of heterosexuality that assumes that 
heterosexuality is the only permissible way of life. Pettiness because it treats/assumes that 
homosexuals want to make the entire community homosexual. The argument that homosexuality 
brings about harm reduces the significance of people to their capacity to reproduce.  
But P1 is false. Queer individuals do not intend to bring about harm to their community; instead it 
is the heteronormative standards that permeate in the community that bring about harm. Below I 
indicate how the argument that homosexuality is harmful is ignorant and is philosophically 
unsound. Homosexuals do not ‘intend’ to bring about harm to the community. Being queer is no 
plan or an intention, just as being heterosexual is no plan or an intention.  
If this reading is correct, then we understand that the claim that homosexuality is harmful lacks 
philosophical validity and soundness. Instead, the communitarian needs to admit that they are 
unjustly prejudicial against homosexuals. In the concluding paragraph of his paper, Matolino 
reminds us that both “heterosexuality and homosexuality are essentially about being attracted to 
bodies within the broad spectrum of available bodies – either of the same sex or different sex” 
(Matolino, 14). In Judith Butler’s words, one’s sexuality and gender are not marks of what one is, 
rather they are markers of what one does (1990).  Dlamini also argues that there needs to be greater 
respect regarding people’s sexuality instead of ascribing it to evil and harm. He states: “instead of 
ascribing to evil what a person fails to understand, why not simply respect it?” (2006: 68). 
Interestingly, Ugandan feminist Sylvia Tamale argues in Out of the Closet: Unveiling Sexuality 
Discourses in Uganda (2000), that patriarchy exploits cultural traditions to sustain gender hierarchy 
by enshrouding sexuality. Furthermore, she notes that “issues such as homosexuality are prohibited 
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in recent conversation for fear that the discussion of those issues would disrupt heterosexist 
privileges” (Tamale, 2000) cited in Mwangi 2009: 221).  
The argument from the normative traditionalist as it stands is discriminatory, as it appears in P1. I 
believe that the above section successfully indicated why P1 cannot be accepted. I think that any 
communitarian cannot find any plausible objections to make to this response. The argument that 
homosexuality brings harm avoids the issue. Instead there needs to be an acceptance from defenders 
of communitarianism that having oor bearing children as a necessary condition for personhood is 
anti-queer and ableist. That is, the criterion that individuals need to bear children to gain 
personhood is heterosexual, ableist and exclusionary. Such a criterion takes heteronormativity to be 
at the centre of personhood and thus has this invisible power that dictates which societal norms 
(Chappel, 2014: 6), rites of passage and so forth are regarded as normal.  
Closing remarks 
One of the responses that can be made to this argument, which is a concern that has been 
highlighted by Matolino and Kwame Gyekye (1997) is that such a view does triumph over an 
individual’s human rights. Along this line and in examining the communitarian worldview one 
would wonder whether the community has the right to place certain obligations on any individual. 
Though these questions are interesting and may be linked to the topic of this paper, I take it that the 
debates that exist between moderate communitarianism and radical communitarianism (see 
Matolino (2009) and Gyekye (1997)) have exhausted this argument. A recurring question that I 
asked in the previous section that the communitarian need to answer is this: ‘why does the 
communitarian think that these obligations define what a person is?' Whilst Menkiti’s motivations 
for doing so may partly be to distance his account from “Western” alternatives (which do not really 
consider any moral obligations that people may have to any community). The rites he details seem 
to be implied by his understanding of the nature of the certain cultures that inform his theory – why 
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they ended being so constituted doesn’t appear to be his concern. However, even if this was the case 
the posed question remains unanswered.    
To conclude, we are justified to reject P1 and P2, insofar as these two premises are exclusive 
towards homosexuals, infertile individuals and intersex people. The argument given by the 
normative traditionalist assumes that homosexuality as a practice is a threat to the community. In 
this section, I deliberately refrained from treating homosexuality as a ‘choice’, yet I am aware that it 
can also be a choice in so far as we take sexuality to be fluid. Having said that, I explicitly refrained 
from using the language of choice because one could then make arguments that individuals who 
actively refrain from having children, say a heterosexual fertile man could also be denied 
personhood. However, I do not think that such an argument and the one presented follow the same 
logic. The plausible argument is that infertility, intersexuality and homosexuality as I have argued 
are not choices. P1 and P2 fail to recognise this and they are arbitrarily discriminative. The 
heterosexual fertile man has a say in whether he wants to attain personhood. But this is not the case 
for people who are infertile, intersex or homosexual.          
 
II. c. ‘the argument that ableism is ‘unAfrican’ 
The last objection that this thesis considers against the reading that communitarian conceptions of 
persons are gendered in a discriminatory manner, ableist or anti-queer is inspired by Chris Bell’s 
(2006) critique that disability studies have focused on only white people with disabilities. Bell 
argues that researchers of disability studies have failed to include scholars like W.E.B Du Bois 
(1996), Alice Walker (1983) and Ginu Kamani (1995) who have all written about disability 
respectively. Bell’s views allude to a philosophical puzzle, that is if (as constructionists think) our 
views about the world are mediated by the conceptual frameworks we adopt (possibly those 
imposed on us by our social context), and then there might be something to the view that the 
concept of disability is ‘Western’. Such thoughts would have rightly led some scholars to think that 
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disability studies are a study about white disabilities. I believe that such views nullify disabilities; 
like the argument that gender is a Western concept. Views like these fail to consider the lived 
experience of people with disabilities. Such thoughts and views are reductionist and cannot be 
maintained. I will explore why nullifying disabilities brings forth some problems to African people 
living with disabilities.  
It goes without saying that claims regarding the ableist nature of theories of personhood are not 
particular to African philosophy only. This sort of criticism has also been raised against Harry 
Frankfurt (1971), John Locke (1975) and Gerald Dworkin (1988) (philosophers that define 
personhood according to the ‘rational capacity of an individual’). Any theory of personhood that 
wants to make ‘rationality’ a necessary condition for personhood faces the same problems. Be that 
as it may, the matters faced by Western philosophers or philosophies are outside the scope of my 
dissertation. Primarily because I think that their conception of personhood is individualistic and not 
communitarian like some of the ones that I have considered so far.21 The underlying critique here is 
towards philosophical realism; realists place rationality at the core of their theory which excludes 
people with disabilities, more specifically people with SCD. 
In section I of this dissertation I made the claims that both the force and the shadow thesis are 
ableist. With regards to the force thesis, I made the claim that Tempels conception of muntu as 
having intelligence and will, excludes people with SCD. Further consideration should be had in 
how the force thesis conceives of cognitive disabilities, where the lack of intelligence and will is 
regarded as a diminution of force because of some ‘magical recipe’ that needs to be cured.  
When sketching the shadow thesis, I argued that SCD people would be denied both the status of 
muntu and Muntu (see diagram B).  Here I equated intelligence with rationality (as with the force 
                                                
21 This may be construed as an overly homogenizing claim. Overly homogenizing because not all 
western conceptions of the person are obviously individualistic (I am thinking primarily of feminist 
accounts of the relational self here). However, at a token level, the different schools of thought have 
come to be seen this way.    
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thesis), stating that this principle would exclude SCD people. Moreover, when outlining the 
normative conception of personhood as an expectative morality model of persons, in passing I 
mentioned that the ethic presupposes that an individual can only be ascribed moral responsibility if 
they have a mind, are metaphysically free and so forth. A presupposition which I argue excludes 
people with SCD. 
The normative conception of a person is defined by normativity as I have explained in the first 
section of this project. This normative criterion is grounded on the moral norms that a person would 
have to adhere to in a community. James reminds us that moral development starts from the early 
ages of four to six years old. During this period, children gain moral development based on the 
interactions that they have with their caregivers (2010: 63- 64). I think that this is not in 
contradiction to Menkiti’s claims that moral norms are learnt and ascribed by the community. Yet 
an individual with SCD would be unlikely to grasp certain moral norms.  
According to James SCD people (IQ between 25-40) are “expected to reach a mental age of about 
four to six years by the age of sixteen years and thus can be expected to establish self-awareness 
and make choices based on his/her understanding, but will have less flexibility in thinking than a 
typically developing child of that mental age” (ibid.: 64). One is then inclined to ask if Menkiti’s 
normative communitarian conception of personhood is cognisant of the fact that SCD people would 
not grasp those communal norms as prescribed by the community. Consequently, I suspect that 
such individuals would not be granted any personhood.  
Although Menkiti makes it clear that “the approach to persons in traditional thought is a maximal, 
or more exacting approaching, insofar as it reaches for something beyond such minimalist 
requirements as the presence of consciousness22 , memory23 , will, soul, rationality24  or mental 
                                                
22 Own emphasis   
23 Own emphasis   
24 Own emphasis  
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function25” (2004: 326); it remains unclear how one would be expected to uphold the moral norms 
of the community without having rational reflection. Upholding the moral norms of the community 
requires first that one is conscious of what these norms are, and second, that one can remember 
what these norms are. I contend that the project of personhood is dependent on these minimalist 
requirements. It would seem then that as per force thesis, shadow thesis and the normative 
conception of person, SCD people and those who are unable to reproduce children would fall 
outside of the descriptive and normative bounds of personhood. In consequence, the normative 
communitarian would exclude such people from gaining moral personhood. 
The critique that the conceptions of persons are ableist stem from the idea that these theories have 
normalised abled-bodies at the core of what counts as persons. Tobin Siebers defines this frame of 
thinking as “the ideology of ability” (2008: 8); which refers to the preference for ‘abled-bodynes’. 
He further states that the ideology of ability defines the “baseline by which humanness is 
determined, setting the measure of body and mind that gives or denies human status to individual 
persons” (ibid.). In light of these considerations, the purpose of this section is to ascertain the merits 
of rejecting the studied conceptions of personhood. This section does not seek to provide an 
anthropological descriptive view of disability, but a plausible philosophical argument on how the 
studied conceptions of personhood are ableist.  I expose the various ways in which they exemplify 
themselves as ableist and thereafter respond to the claim that ableism is ‘unAfrican’. In this section, 
I indicate the various ways in which ableism has played itself out in African communities. I contend 
that the justification for the ill-treatment of people with disabilities is premised on the notion that 
they are excluded from the category of personhood as identified in all three conceptions of 
personhood examined in this research. I have a lot to say about the empirical implications of this 
exclusiveness. I reject any claims that may be made by reductionist scholars who argue that ableism 
                                                
25 Own emphasis 
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is a Western concept. Just as personhood is a relational concept, constructs of gender, sexuality and 
disability are premised on power. As Crenshaw (cited in Erevelles and Minear: 2014, 356) explains:  
“To say that a category such as race and gender is socially constructed is not to say that the category 
has no significance in our world. On the contrary, a large and continuing project for subordinated 
people…is thinking about the way in which power is clustered around certain categories and is 
exercised against others”   
 
1.1. Some views of disability in Africa  
Chomba Wa Munyi states that communities have had various reasons for ill-treating people with 
disabilities, one of those reasons was that such individuals were an economic liability. He further 
contends that in other cultures “they were given respected status” (2012).  For instance, in the 
Chagga community in East Africa people with physical disabilities were regarded as the “pacifiers 
of evil spirits”. In Dahomey, in West Africa now known as Benin, “constables were selected from 
those with obvious physical handicaps”. Furthermore, children with anomalies were regarded as 
being protected by a supernatural force (ibid.). In Ghana, SCD people were believed to be a 
reincarnation of a deity. In contrast, Munyi states that among the Ashanti of central Ghana men who 
had any physical disability were not allowed to become chiefs. Moreover, that children born with 
more than five fingers, on one hand, were killed from birth. Research indicates that children with 
albinism have been killed in large parts of Southern Africa for their body parts, as there is the belief 
that they “have magical powers and bring good luck” (Surendran, 2016).   
Of interest to my investigation are the views that those born with any disability whether they are 
outcast or not are believed to either possess some form of evil or good fortune. It seems clear that 
such views are ableist as they are premised on the idea that any individual who is not born ‘normal’ 
must have something special about them and therefore they must be treated differently from an 
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‘abled’ person26. The problem is that such thoughts use disability as a metaphor for something else 
(this is often heard in African proverbs, like this one –which is negative: “Wahleka sichwala nawe 
uyawuchwala ngemuso, or, should you laugh at a disabled [individual], you will also be disabled in 
future.” (Ndlovu 2016: 36). This assumes that there is something wrong with having a disability in 
any form.  
The Songye proverb: “Ha mulemane utwela, kibi e kubuwa kingo (When the disabled [individual] 
enters, the door is completely shut”), meaning that an individual with a disability is believed to have 
some wisdom, and for this wisdom to be shared the door should be shut (Devlieger, 2010: 443). 
This kind of proverb, although it affirms disability in a positive manner is problematic. The problem 
is that it does not recognise the individual as a person, rather treats them in a certain way because of 
their disability. Hebron L. Ndlovu argues that such proverbs indicate that people with disabilities in 
African communities are not defined by their “physical, mental, or psychological qualities”, instead 
by the interpersonal relationships that they have with other members of their communities (2016: 
36).  
I disagree with Ndlovu’s interpretation of the proverb, what this proverb indicates is the manner in 
which people with disabilities are reduced to their disability, one of which according to the proverb 
‘one must not ridicule in case it may revert to you’. Fundamentally these views 
essentalise/pathologises people with disabilities. It removes the focus from the individual to their 
disability, to what their disability could potentially do/mean for the community- “disability becomes 
the essential aspect of their identities, at least in the eyes of observers, so that their personalities, 
abilities, interests and other personal qualities are subordinated by a condition that is perceived to 
be a dominant trait” (Dunn and Andrews, 2015: 259). Fundamentally these proverbs deny people 
with disabilities personhood and view them as a monolithic group. Further to that, they do not 
                                                
26 But I wonder whether ableist would be the right label for someone who affirmed the disability. I 
am thinking if feminist movements that have reclaimed certain labels and stereotypes and have 
affirmed the value judgements attached to them, would we similarly call these movements sexist?  
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recognise that disability is both visible (e.g. cognitive disabilities) and invisible (e.g. infertility). So 
even if some communities may affirm the positive view of disability, such a view remains ableist.   
 In citing Lippman (1972: 89), Munyi states that in most societies people with disabilities are 
categorised as “deviants rather than inmates by the society” (2012). Munyi makes the disclaimer 
that such views in Africa were largely held because of ignorance, superstition or fear. Yet, if we are 
serious in our philosophical work, we must ask what grounds such ignorance, superstition or fear? It 
may be sufficient to accept that misconceptions regarding disabilities are universal; that they have 
been institutionalised over the years and therefore there aren’t sufficient grounds to place the 
burden on African conceptions of persons to be progressive. Notably, even in Western thought, 
disability studies are a recent area of focus.  As compelling as it is to accept such a claim, I don’t 
believe that just because the misconception regarding disability is universal, then certain disciplines 
are ‘saved’ from engaging with disability.  
I suspect that the objection that the force and the shadow thesis are ableist (not forgetting the 
normative communitarian ethic), could be put as follows: that communitarian theories of persons do 
not justify the ill-treatment of individuals living with disabilities. Said differently, the theory merely 
articulates that such individuals do not meet the necessary and sufficient conditions for personhood. 
Perhaps the communitarian may add that he is not concerned about how communities treat such 
individuals, as such a concern falls in the realm of communitarianism as a theory 27 . The 
communitarian may further respond by saying that traces of such views can be traced back to the 
Greeks and the early Christian Doctrine, which through imperialism and colonisation these views 
have found themselves in Africa. Therefore, ableist views are not African.  
 
1.2. A theory is just a theory  
                                                
27 In the introductory paragraphs, I articulated the difference between communitarianism as a theory 
and communitarian conceptions of persons  
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Tempels would reject the claims that the force thesis is ableist, he will probably say that those who 
discriminate against people with disabilities do not understand force. Recall that as per the force 
thesis, understanding the hierarchy of force is a necessary condition for personhood, and so any 
individual who fails to understand this hierarchy cannot be referred to as muntu. Tempels argues 
that “[t]hose who think that, per the Bantu, one being can entirely annihilate another, to the point 
that he ceases to exist, conceive a false idea. Doubtless one force that is greater than another can 
paralyse it, diminish it, or even cause its operation totally to cease, but for all that the force does not 
cease to exist. Existence which comes from God only be taken away by God herself who is the 
source of force (Tempels, 1959: 39). The point being made here is that it is only God who has the 
power to deny or annihilate muntu’s force. Simply put, only God can deny/say that a certain 
individual is not a person.  
But the given explanation by Tempels is not convincing. Upon close assessment of the force thesis 
(see diagram A), human beings who lack intelligence and will do not have a category of their own 
in this hierarchy. In reading Tempels thesis the reader is informed that the muntu “who neglects to 
orientate his life in accordance with the ancient norms laid down by Bantu wisdom will be treated 
as “kidima28” by his fellows: that is to say as a sub-human, a man of insufficient mind to count as 
‘muntu’. (1959: 49). I think that this point highlights an inconsistency in Tempels theorisation (that 
needs to be resolved) by failing to locate the ‘kidima’ in the hierarchy. Perhaps Tempels would not 
view this as an inconsistency, instead, he would place SCD people/‘kidima’ in the same category as 
animal, plant and mineral – that being the category of inferior forces. The plausible option seems to 
be the latter. If this is the case, then Tempels theory does inform how SCD people are treated in 
communities. Given that Tempels states that inferior forces exist to increase the vital force of 
Beings i.e. they are created for the disposal use of man. Then the discrimination of SCD people is 
justified, either positively or negatively.  
                                                
28 In a footnote, the translator explains that a kidima is a “man who has not enough brains to be 
considered a normal person” (1959: 49).  
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A critic may argue that the above-mentioned argument is merely my own insertion of Tempels 
thesis. That is, they would argue that a theory is just a theory. Insofar as the given conceptions of 
personhood do not prescribe how individuals who fail at personhood or attain personhood should be 
treated. These theories merely articulate a conception of personhood. The same could be said about 
both the shadow and the normative conception of persons.  
These scholars could bite the bullet and accept that their theories are exclusive to people with 
disabilities, yet their exclusion of such people makes no grounds for such a heavy projection. I 
assume that the critic may further say that I am conflating communitarianism as an ethic and 
communitarian conceptions of persons. Where the former prescribes how persons and nonpersons 
should be treated in a particular communal context and the latter just merely gives an account of 
personhood. And so, his final remarks would be that my critiques are directed in the wrong place, 
that this is a fight that I should be having with the communitarian theorist.     
 
1.3. Theories are not just theories  
I think that there are problems with the argument presented by the communitarian that articulates 
the idea that his theory does not give grounds for societies to discriminate against people with 
disabilities. In articulating a difference between communitarianism as a theory and communitarian 
conceptions of persons, I indicated that the latter can often arise from the former. One will recall 
that this paper approached disability through the lens of the social model of disability, which views 
disability as “the consequence of social prejudice and a failure of social responsiveness to 
requirements of variant abilities and bodily demands” (Kittay, 2005: 98).  
Such social prejudice is arguably informed by the notion of who counts as a person and who does 
not. If a concept/theory of persons in its theorisation privileges the existence of certain capabilities 
over others, it assumes that those with the privileged capacities are more important. And so, the 
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communitarian ought to be concerned about those whom it excludes from its theory of personhood. 
Failing to do so would be an ethically irresponsible act, that does not see the danger it places on the 
individual’s lives that are removed from the category of persons.  
The critic may argue that this argument is unconvincing, insofar as children are not considered as 
persons, yet societies do not treat them as inferior or ill-treat them. Ikuenobe states that this is 
because “children have unique moral status and are owed moral obligation and consideration 
because they display [the] potential of acquiring personhood” (2006:61).  Whilst this criticism may 
seem true, such a view assumes that all children are treated equally and I do not think that this is the 
case. I believe that the potential for personhood is only open for children who would be able to 
participate in the given rites of passage (i.e. cisgender and able-bodied children). Children who are 
intersex or have a disability would arguably not be treated in the same manner as cisgender and 
able-bodied children. Because of their ambiguous gender or disability, the potential for acquiring 
personhood is already closed off from this individual from an early age.   
The point is that if a theory is discriminatory, then the practice will equally do the same. Kittay 
informs us that such views are philosophically problematic and posit a potential danger to 
vulnerable people (2009: 607). This is made evident in how people with disabilities have been ill-
treated. I maintain that theories cannot be read as just theories, especially theories like Menkiti’s 
normative conception of persons that define a person using moral language. If “persons are the sort 
of entities that are owed the duties of justice” as inferred by Menkiti (1984:177), then one ought to 
be concerned about the practical implications of such a statement. Such a statement implies that it is 
only persons who can be treated justly; any individual that falls outside of the definition of persons 
is not owed the duties of justice. In his theorisation of personhood, Menkiti makes it clear that the 
extension of moral language or duties of justice is only bound to persons. He argues that the 
extension of these duties to entities that are not persons would “undermine, sooner, or later, the 
clearness of our conception of what it means to be a person. The practical consequences are also 
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something for us to worry about” (ibid.).  And so, any theory that makes the distinction between 
persons and nonpersons, such a theory can be held responsible for any practical implications that 
results from it.    
1.4. What’s intersectionality got to do with conceptions of personhood?  
In responding to the claim that ableism is unAfrican, I contend that the issue of disability within 
Africa should be understood through an intersectional lens. That is, disability in Africa, the 
theorization and problematizing of able-bodies cannot be done outside of understanding the effects 
of colonialism. The task of the colonial project was to deny Black people the status of personhood. 
Claims were made that Black people were primitive beings who had no capacity to think for 
themselves i.e. without rationality. Josh Lukin states that the implication was that “blackness was a 
similar mental deficiency” (2014: 312), Mogobe B. Ramose further reminds us that categorising 
Black people as without reason or rationality was also the project of Christianization, which was 
founded in scientific racism (2003: 3). Hence it was justifiable to use Africans as slaves.  
That is, the categorisation of who counts as abled and disabled has been used to assert power on 
certain individuals. Black people, Jews and Women have been historically denied the status of 
personhood, not because they do not have rationality. Instead, it was driven by power. The point 
being made here is that anyone can be regarded as disabled at any time, as Sieber puts it, disability 
“potentially includes anyone at any time” (2008: 71). Black people were regarded as disabled; the 
same could be said for Jews and Women.   
Intersectional theory reminds us that “structures of oppression are related” (Carbado et al.  
2013:306) that is, we need to move away from a singular racialized interpretation of disability. 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson reminds us that exclusionary theories and practices “are legitimated 
by systems of representation, by collective cultural stories that shape the material world, underwrite 
exclusionary attitudes, inform human relations, and mould our senses of who we are. Understanding 
how disability functions along with other systems of representation clarifies how all the systems 
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intersect and mutually constitute one another.” (2002: 10). It is important for any African 
conception of persons to be inclusive.  
I further take it that the conversations around ableism should not be read in isolation from gender 
and queer theory; primarily because these issues concern minority identities. They are all 
interlocking themes that affect one’s personhood and more generally fall into the debates had in 
moral philosophy. Most importantly, what can be taken away from this section is that if one has 
some form of disability, or is queer, intersexual, or is a female, we note that the primary themes of 
inclusivity highlighted in this project become vivid. Put more simply, one who is living with a 
disability is an intersex and queer may be disqualified from considerations of personhood on any of 
the three accounts discussed. 
Closing remarks 
Importantly, the demand that I place on the communitarian to have an inclusive account of persons, 
the kind that would not discriminate against people with disabilities and in particular SCD people 
highlights a philosophical tension that needs to be explored. That is, it seems that any account of 
personhood should be able to distinguish between those who are morally responsible for their 
behaviour, from those who are not. Such an account of personhood should not marginalise people 
with disabilities arbitrarily. Yet, it seems that no account would be able to satisfactorily include 
SCD humans. If rationality which is used as the distinguishing marker for personhood (these moves 
are often drawn on in abortion debates as well, see Singer and Helga (1985), Nussbaum (2005) and 
McMahan (2003)), which refers to the good, proper or logical use of one’s mental capabilities. The 
challenge is why would one include SCD individuals to the category of persons if they cannot use 
their mental capacities? If such individuals say do not understand the ontological importance of the 
community – how does one hold these people morally accountable for their actions?  
This philosophical tension only arises because certain theories and philosophers have placed the 
importance of personhood on descriptive capacities which would grant one personhood. However, I 
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do not think that this needs to be the case. If communitarian theories of personhood were to give an 
account of personhood that has minimal requirements such as participation then this tension would 
be resolved. Such an account of personhood would be one that does not privilege abled-bodies, and 
in the process, ensures inclusivity. Participation is a requirement that does not demand certain 
capacities; equally one would be able to hold such individuals morally accountable for their actions. 
Roughly, a minimal requirement such as participation would entail that individuals are granted 
personhood insofar as they are seen participating in the community in whatever way they can.  
My intensions for this section were to respond to the plausible objection that ableism is an 
unAfrican concept. I discounted these claims and indicated the various ways in which ableism has 
made itself evident in African communities. The rational here was not to view African communities 
as monolithic, rather to expose how ableist views permeate through proverbial talk and thinking. 
Are these views a true reflection of Africa? Answering this question is unnecessary; any view that 
shows itself to be discriminatory ought to be rejected. I then responded to the communitarians 
claim, that a theory is just a theory. I think that this question deserves further philosophical 
consideration. It demands philosophers to interrogate what the role of theorising is. Up to this end, 
this section has successfully indicated how the studied conceptions of personhood are exclusive to 
disability.  
FINAL REMARKS 
“Everybody knew what she was called, but nobody anywhere knew her name. Disremembered and 
unaccounted for, she cannot be lost because no one is looking for her, and even if they were, how can they 
call her if they don’t know her name? Although she has claim, she is not claimed” 
Toni Morrison ((2004: 323) cited in Richardson (2013: 9).    
 
The preliminary remarks that can be drawn from this project is that the African conceptions of 
persons that I have examined in this dissertation have an inherent gender bias, are exclusive to 
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persons with disabilities and queer persons. I will now stop referring to them as individuals or 
people and begin to speak of those with disabilities, intersexual or queer as the persons that I 
believe they are 29  . Using Foucault’s theory of ethics and inclusion, Julie Allan argues that 
“inclusion starts with the premise that an individual has a right to belong to society and its 
institutions, which therefore implies that others have obligations to ensure that this happens. In 
particular, inclusion necessities the removal of barriers that may prevent individuals from 
belonging” (2005: 282).  
Drawing from Allan’s remarks, I understand inclusion to mean just that, the understanding that 
persons have a right to belong to their community irrespective of their positionality. If in African 
conceptions of persons, the normative conception is grounded in morality, which has ethical 
undertones then it has the obligation to ensure that it is not exclusive. As I conclude this project, I 
recognize that inclusion cannot happen overnight, it requires us (academics, scholars, social 
activists and the like) to start doing the work, it entails that as we continue to theorize and engage in 
the scholarly work that we do, we must be cognizant of the importance of inclusion.  
This inclusion can only happen if we recognise that certain “norms and practices of heterosexuality 
[are] centrally anchored in male authority, are emerging or have hardened into the central basis for 
defining personhood” (Salo and Gqola, 2006: 2). Allan nicely puts the point about inclusivity as 
follows: “the ethical project of inclusion will inevitably remain a work in progress” (2005: 293) that 
can be achieved. As African philosophy grows as a discipline, it needs to start taking seriously this 
project of inclusion. I think that this should not be understood as a desire to want a conception of 
personhood that is merely given “because one is born of human seed” (Menkiti, 1984: 172). Rather 
that the rites of passage which are used to grant or deny one personhood should be more inclusive. 
The inclusion for me looks something like a minimalist conception of personhood, which makes no 
                                                
29 Throughout this thesis, I referred to such persons as individuals or people to avoid begging the 
question. Now that I have successfully indicated the exclusive nature of the studied theories to these 
people, such a shift is justified.   
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pronouncements (and hence, no restrictions) on what sort of admissible behaviour would be better – 
since it would not incur the sorts of problems which I attributed to Menkiti. In many ways, the 
inherent exclusive nature of the conceptions of persons has a negative effect on the normative 
communities as defined by Menkiti; it means that the pull of ancestors who make up both the living 
dead and the nameless dead will only repeat the exclusion found in the conceptions of persons. The 
exclusive nature of communitarianism means that the marginalised individuals will be 
disremembered and disposed of. It means that the pool of ancestors will be limited, as per Menkiti 
only persons can become ancestors and so if certain individuals are not given granted personhood 
they will not be remembered.  
African philosophy is a philosophy that can be read as one that it written by people whose 
personhood has been denied through slavery, colonialism, apartheid and so forth – these scholars 
understand what it means to be ‘othered’ and removed from the category of persons. The optimistic 
assumption is that these scholars would not ‘other’ individuals since they know how it feels to be in 
that position. As I worked on this project, I understood that Tempels and Menkiti were involved in 
the political project of giving Africans their sense of personhood that Whiteness has historically 
aimed to deny them. Rightly so such any political project should move beyond race and include 
alternative genders, sexuality and dis/ability.   
At the start of my dissertation, I outlined how communitarian conceptions of persons construe of 
persons as essentially relational. This relational aspect of persons entails that there is a level of 
moral interdependence. Thus, the request is that theories of African personhood need to be aware of 
this moral interdependence, which Dan Goodly defines as “self-becoming-other by means of 
entering into another person’s frame of reference and taking upon oneself the other perspective” 
(2014: 113). Greestein (cited in Goodley) states that “relational beings should be guided by a stance 
of getting-to-know, openness to communication that recognises differences cannot be erased and 
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that conflict and resistance are inevitable within human relations, but as a productive possibility” 
(ibid.: 114).  
My final point is that the demand for inclusive theories of persons is not about making African 
philosophy fashionable say, to the social sciences or humanities. Rather, it’s a call for African 
philosophers to come to the table and start taking issues of gender, sexuality and dis/ability with 
much seriousness as they did with race. I take it that this demand is not any different from the one 
articulated by Hountondji in African Philosophy, Myth and Reality (1983), where he urges African 
philosophers of the present to “reorient their discourse” (1983:54). Indeed, the conclusions reached 
in this dissertation point to the failure of African philosophy to seriously move beyond the political 
project of self-definition. In echo of Hountondji, there is a need for African philosophers to realise 
that the word philosophy is in active and not passive voice.  
CONCLUSION 
In the introduction, I set out two objectives for my dissertation: a) to determine how conceptions of 
personhood in African philosophical communitarian theories are exclusionary with regards to 
gender, sexuality and ability, and b) to ascertain the merits of retaining (or rejecting) the theories for 
further philosophical consideration. I think that these objectives have been met. The first section of 
this thesis sketched out three prominent theories of personhood in African philosophy; by the end of 
this section I had made several observations.  
The first is that the shadow thesis is not a communitarian account of persons, as it has been 
construed by Kaphagawani, nonetheless it has also shown itself to be exclusive to SCD persons. 
Equally, the force thesis and the normative thesis failed to pass the test of inclusivity. Any theory of 
persons that bases its definition on metaphysical capacities will fail the test. At the start of this 
paper I stated that the normative communitarian faces far more pressure in ensuring that his theory 
is inclusive, insofar as his theory has moral undertones. Hence much of my dissertation focused on 
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Menkiti’s theory. I believe that I have successfully indicated that unless revised in consideration of 
the criteria for inclusivity, their theories should be rejected.   
In addition to this, I outlined two options that are available to the communitarian in view of the 
conclusion that I reached in this project. I alluded to the point that the second option seems 
preferable (namely, that we revise these conceptions of person, so that we have an account(s) that 
is/are not gendered, anti-queer or ableist), if one accepts that communitarian conceptions of 
personhood are worthy.  This is a view that I am more inclined to uphold, my aims for this project 
where not to articulate an individualistic conception of personhood. Rather to retain the merits of 
communitarianism. 
 The ‘community’ to which persons are somehow related need not be considered as static. Take 
Menkiti’s view. There is some plausibility to the view that to achieve personhood one should be 
able to participate in their community. To demand of intersex people that they marry and bear 
children is unjust. But to recognise intersex persons as being part of their own category (to do away 
with gender binary) and that special rights and responsibilities accrue to people in that special 
category may take away the sting of Menkiti’s present account. In that sense, he could preserve his 
account of personhood and yet it would no longer be staunchly exclusive. Not in virtue of changing 
his views on personhood but in virtue of a community with distinct values. It is worth noting either 
that it is assumed that communities are static (and that’s it!), or that although it is often assumed, it 
need not be so, and could generate further avenues for inquiry. 
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